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I. INTRODUCTION
Statistical evidence plays a large role in employment discrimination
cases. It is almost essential in both pattern-and-practice cases' and disparate-
impact cases,2 and it is sometimes used in support of individual disparate-
* Professor, Wayne State University Law School. 0 2017 Kingsley R. Browne. E-mail:
kingsley.browne@wayne.edu. My thanks to April Bleske-Rechek, Tony Dillof, John Dolan, John
Rothchild, and participants in a brownbag discussion at Wayne State University Law School, for comments
on a prior draft of this paper.
See, e.g, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
See, e.g, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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treatment cases. Hundreds of reported employment discrimination cases
involve the use of statistical evidence,4 and in many cases the evidence is
treated as largely dispositive, at least for purposes of establishing a prima
facie case or certifying a class, and often for liability itself. Numerous law-
review articles have been devoted to the topic, and most law school casebooks
in the field cover issues of statistical proof.
The typical statistical case relies on what is known as "null hypothesis
significance testing" (hereinafter "NHST"). When the demographic group of
interest is not proportionally represented in some component of an employer's
workforce, the question is whether the under-representation is so great that it
should be concluded that the disparity is not just a result of chance (like
getting only four heads in ten coin tosses, rather than the statistically
"expected" five). The inference that the plaintiff would like drawn is that the
observed disparity is so great that chance is not a likely explanation and that
an impermissible criterion (e.g., race or sex) is instead to blame. Using
NHST, the plaintiffs statistical expert will test the "null hypothesis" that
hiring (or promotion, etc.) is random with respect to, say, race-in that blacks
and whites in the relevant groups have an equal chance of being selected-
and reject that hypothesis if the disparity is "statistically significant," usually
meaning that the results are such that would be found only among less than
5% of employers hiring at random with respect to race. Rejection of the null
hypothesis leads to acceptance of the alternative hypothesis, of which more
later.
One might expect that even if the nuances of statistical analysis are
sometimes misunderstood by legal professionals, at least there would be
broad consensus on what might be called "the basics." Unfortunately, to the
extent that there is broad consensus on the basics, the consensus is wrong. In
fact, courts routinely make fundamental errors in their interpretation of
statistical evidence.'
There are a number of problems with NHST, but one basic error that
courts regularly make is what has been called the "transposition fallacy."6 In
the context of a discrimination lawsuit, one commits the transposition fallacy
by equating the probability of an observed statistical disparity given random
selection with the probability of random selection given the observed
3 See, e.g., Baylie v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 476 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that
statistical evidence is relevant, but only marginally so, in individual disparate-treatment cases); Obrey v.
Johnson, 400 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that such evidence is relevant and therefore admissible).
' A Westlaw search of the "All Federal" database on September 6, 2017, found 500 cases satisfying
the query ("Title VII" and "statistically significant") and 3,530 satisfying the query ("Title VII" and
"statistical evidence").
' See generally Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies,"
68 WASH. L. REV. 477 (1993) [hereinafter Browne, Beyond Damned Lies].
6 See Kingsley R. Browne, The Strangely Persistent "Transposition Fallacy": Why "Statistically
Significant" Evidence ofDiscrimination May Not Be Significant, 14 LAB. LAW. 437 (1998); HANS ZEISEL
& DAVID H. KAYE, PROVE IT WiTH FIGURES: EMPHUCAL METHODS IN LAW AND LITIGATION 82 (1997).
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disparity.' What might seem to be a mere technical error-confusion between
two things that sound very much alike-has substantial real-world effects,
because it causes courts to mistakenly conclude that they can quantify the
likelihood that the employer's selection process was random with respect to
the trait at issue. In many cases, the courts' conclusions are understandable,
because they are led into their error, whether wittingly or unwittingly, by the
parties' experts.
Even if the transposition fallacy could be avoided-which seems
unlikely given its persistence in the face of decades of scholarly criticism-a
more comprehensive problem with much statistical proof is its reliance on
NHST in the first place. As will be discussed below, there is a widespread
and growing dissatisfaction with the use of NHST, partly because of the ease
with which it leads to the transposition fallacy, but also because of other
weaknesses, such as its tendency to lead researchers to conflate statistical and
practical significance and to erroneously conclude that rejection of the null
hypothesis necessarily demonstrates the truth of some specified alternative
hypothesis.
This article will proceed in two parts. First, I will discuss the
ubiquitous transposition fallacy, showing how it misleads courts and why it
matters. Second, I will describe some of the other problems with NHST,
which make it an inappropriate basis for determining liability.
II. THE TRANSPOSITION FALLACY
A. What is the Transposition Fallacy?
Formally, the transposition fallacy, which goes by several names,'
entails equating "the probability of A given B" with "the probability of B
given A." Consider two statements: (1) "there is a 99.9% chance that the
animal will have two arms and two legs given that it is a chimpanzee (the
uncertainty deriving from the possibility of a birth defect or amputation); and
(2) "there is a 99.9% chance that the animal is a chimpanzee given that it has
two arms and two legs." The latter proposition obviously does not follow
ZEISEL & KAYE, supra note 6, at 82.
8 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 133
(1996) (referring to the fallacy as "the fallacy of the transposed conditional"); Browne, Beyond Damned
Lies, supra note 5, at 484-503 (referring to the fallacy as "the statistical fallacy"); David H. Kaye &
Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic Evidence?, J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y, Series A
75, 77 (1991) (referring to the fallacy as the "inversion fallacy"); William C. Thompson & Edward L.
Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the
Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 181 (1987) (referring to the fallacy as the
"prosecutor's fallacy"); GEOFF CUMMING, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW STATISTICS: EFFECT SIZES,
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS, AND META-ANALYSIS 27, 27 (referring to the fallacy as the "inverse probability
fallacy"); Thomas Selike, M. J. Bayarri, & James 0. Berger, Calibration of p Values for Testing Precise
Null Hypotheses, 55 AM. STATISTICIAN 62, 62 (2001) (referring to the fallacy as the "p value fallacy")
[hereinafter Sellke et al.]; Jacob Cohen, The Earth is Round (p <.05), 49 AM. PSYCHOL. 997, 999 (1994)
(referring to the fallacy as the "inverse probability error").
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from the former, and no one would for a minute argue that it did. Yet
arguments with exactly that form abound in legal cases.
1. The Prosecutor's Fallacy
Before examining the transposition fallacy in the context of
employment discrimination cases-where the fallacy is both ubiquitous and
unrecognized by the courts-it might be useful to describe an area of the law
where the fallacy is much more widely recognized: the use of DNA profiles
in criminal prosecutions. Indeed, the fallacy has its own name in such cases,
where it goes by the name of the "prosecutor's fallacy" because of the unfair
advantage that it gives prosecutors in DNA cases.
Imagine that forensic investigators at the scene of a murder find a
blood sample that they believe came from the perpetrator. A DNA profile
from that blood is compared to a DNA database and yields a "cold hit" on
Innocent Irving, who unfortunately does not have an alibi for the time when
the crime was committed. The likelihood that a random person who was not
the source of the crime-scene DNA sample would have matching DNA is 1
in 10,000. Bingo!
The prosecutor would like to argue to the jury that, given the
infrequency of the DNA profile, there is only a I in 10,000 chance that the
finding was coincidental and a 9,999 in 10,000 chance that Irving was the
actual source of the crime-scene sample. In other words, the prosecutor would
equate the probability that a sample of DNA from the crime scene would
match a randomly selected person given that he is not the source ofthe crime-
scene DNA (1 in 10,000 in our case), with the probability that he is not the
source of the crime-scene DNA given that there is a match.' This fallacious
argument is a powerful one for the prosecutor, indicating to the jury that the
probability that Irving is the source of the DNA is .9999 (and, of course, the
prosecutor would like the jury to make the next inference, which is that if he
was the source of the crime-scene DNA, he is necessarily the murderer).
The error in the prosecutor's argument has seemed relatively obvious
to courts, many of which have described the prosecutor's fallacy and pointed
out its error,'o despite the fact that the prosecutor's fallacy embodies the same
' See DAVID H. KAYE & GEORGE SENSABAUGH, Reference Guide on DNA Identification Evidence,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTiFIc EVIDENCE, 168 n.88 (3d ed. 2011); Thompson & Schumann,
supra note 8, 170-71.
1o The United States Supreme Court has described the prosecutor's fallacy as follows:
The prosecutor's fallacy is the assumption that the random match probability is the
same as the probability that the defendant was not the source of the DNA sample. .
. . Ilfajuror is told the probability a member of the general population would share
the same DNA is 1 in 10,000 (random match probability), and he takes that to mean
there is only at in 10,000 chance that someone other than the defendant is the source
of the DNA found at the crime scene (source probability), then he has succumbed
to the prosecutor's fallacy. It is further error to equate source probability with
probability of guilt, unless there is no explanation other than guilt for a person to be
116 [Vol. 42:2
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flawed reasoning that leads courts to conclude in discrimination cases that the
p-value provides the probability of random selection." For some reason, what
seems at least somewhat widely appreciated in the criminal contextl 2 seems
not to penetrate other contexts.
2. The Transposition Fallacy in Discrimination Cases
The equivalent of the prosecutor's fallacy is a staple of discrimination
cases. A concrete example of the fallacy in the discrimination context will
illustrate. Suppose that a given employer has 500 employees and that blacks
constitute 20 percent of the qualified labor force in the relevant market. We
would expect statistically that 20% (100 employees) of the employer's
workforce would be black. When we say that we would "expect" the
employer to have 20 percent black employees, we do not mean that we would
actually believe that every employer would have exactly that number, any
more than we would expect that every time a person flipped a coin 100 times.
the result would be exactly 50 heads and 50 tails. Instead, what we mean is
that out of a very large number of non-discriminating employers, we would
expect the average representation of black employees to be 20%, just as we
would expect that, over the course of many instances of fair coins being
flipped 100 times, the average result would be 50:50. Very few employers of
500 people (less than 5 percent) would actually be predicted to have exactly
100 black employees, just as few people (less than 8 percent) who toss a coin
100 times would be predicted to get exactly 50 heads.' 3
the source of crime-scene DNA. This faulty reasoning may result in an erroneous
statement that, based on a random match probability of I in 10,000, there is a .01%
chance the defendant is innocent or a 99.99% chance the defendant is guilty.
McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 128 (2010).
In McDaniel, the prosecution expert had testified that in light of the I in 3,000,000 random-match
probability, it was "not inaccurate" to say that the likelihood that the sample had not come from the
defendant was .000033. Id Moreover, the prosecutor had argued in his closing that the jury could be
"99.999967 sure" that the DNA came from the defendant. Id at 128-29.
" The same DNA statistics can be misused by the defendant as well, of course. The defendant might
argue, for example, that in a city of 1,000,000 people, a hundred would be expected to match the sample.
Based solely on the DNA evidence, then, one might well argue that the chance the sample came from the
defendant-rather than being 9,999 out of 10,000-is actually I out of 100. That would be true, of course,
only if the only evidence in the case is the DNA frequency evidence and all persons having matching DNA
could potentially be the culprit (which, of course, would presumably not be true of small children). To
make the one-in-a-hundred argument in the face of other evidence tying the defendant to the crime is to
engage in the "defense attorney's fallacy." See Thompson & Schumann, supra note 8, at 171.
12 See, e.g, McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. at 128; U.S. v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir.
1994); U.S. v. Shea, 957 F. Supp. 331, 332 (D. N.H. 1997); U.S. v. Pritchard, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209
(C.D. Cal. 2014); State v. Jackson, 221 P.3d 1213, 1222 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 2009); State v. Ragland, 739
S.E.2d 616, 623 (N.C. App. 2013) (agreeing with defendant's contention that the state's expert committed
the "prosecutor's fallacy" but affirming conviction because other overwhelming evidence indicated that
admission was not "plain error"); Brown v. Farwell, 525 F.3d 787, 795-796 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 558
U.S. 120 (2010) (affirming grant of habeas corpus on the basis of expert testimony equating random-match
probability with source probability).
13 These probabilities can be calculated using an online binomial calculator. Binomial Calculator:
Online Statistical Table, STAT TREK, http://stattrek.com/online-calculator/binomial.aspx (last visited May
1 2017).
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Suppose, however, that our employer has 82 black employees instead
of the "expected" 100. Clearly, it has fewer than expected, but is it
sufficiently fewer that we ought to be suspicious that some nefarious cause-
or even just a systematic cause that may or may not be nefarious-is
responsible? The statistical analysis used in employment discrimination cases
is intended to answer that question, although it answers that question
substantially less well than is generally assumed.
In order to test this question, the statistician will use null hypothesis
significance testing. The "null hypothesis" that is tested is that there is no
difference in the likelihood of selection of blacks versus whites;14 that is, the
composition of the employer's workforce is a product of forces that are purely
random with respect to race, such that any differences that do exist are a
product of sampling error (that is, the luck of the particular draw). The
alternative hypothesis, which would be accepted if the null hypothesis is
rejected, is that there is in fact a racial difference in the probability of
selection. That is, there is something systematic leading to the racial disparity
(and, of course, the plaintiff would argue that the "something" is racial
discrimination, though rejection of the null hypothesis does not lead
ineluctably-or even necessarily very strongly-to that conclusion").
" In practice, the null hypothesis is generally a hypothesis of no difference, but it does not have to be
so. The null hypothesis is any hypothesis to be "nullified." Gerd Gigerenzer, Mindless Statistics, 33 J.
Socio-ECON., 587, 589 (2004). Some statisticians refer to a null hypothesis of no difference as the "nil
hypothesis." See, e.g., REx B. KLINE, BEYOND SIGNIFICANCE TESTING: STATISTICS REFORM IN THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 69, 69 (2013).
"s See infra Sections .ILA, III.D. It is also important to note that contrary to occasional statements to
the contrary, failing to reject the null hypothesis does not entail an "acceptance" of it. That is, one can
never prove the null hypothesis. See CumMING, supra note 8 at 29 ("We must therefore be careful not to
take statistical nonsignificance (the null is not rejected) as evidence of a zero effect (the null is true).").
Cumming cautions against the "slippery slope of non-significance," whereby "[a]n effect is found to be
statistically nonsignificant then later discussed as if that showed it to be zero"). Id For examples of this
error, see STEPHANIE R. THOMAs, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ADVERSE IMPACT 45 (2011) ("If there is no
statistically significant difference between the actual and expected outcomes experienced by protected and
non-protected individuals, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. One would infer that the null hypothesis
is true, and conclude that there is no relationship between protected status and the outcome of the
challenged employment practice or policy." (emphasis added)); Report of Helen Reynolds, Ph.D., Ellis v.
Crawford, No. 3:03-cv-02416, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3457 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2005) ("The significance
level (called "p") of 5 percent is often used as the cut-off point. Ifp is greater than 0.05, then one can say
that the two amounts are not really different. That is, if p is 0.05 or greater, there is, at minimum, a 5
percent (one in twenty) chance that, all else equal, the observed difference is due to chance and chance
alone. If that is the case, we would accept the null hypothesis that there was no statistical diference in the
two numbers" (emphasis added)); MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, & REBECCA HANNER
WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 134 (8th ed., 2013) [hereinafter
ZIMMER ET AL., 8th ed.] (noting that "[t]he employer would prefer to confirm the null hypothesis-that is,
to show that any difference is due to chance" (emphasis added)); id. at 133 ("To use probability theory to
prove discrimination, a statistician would construct an assumption, called the null hypothesis, which would
then be tested and either accepted or rejected." (emphasis added)).
118 [Vol. 42:2
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The distribution of the demographic profile of employers' workforces
can be represented graphically by the "normal" or "bell-shaped" curve.
Figure 1 is a representation of a hypothetical distribution of employers of 500
employees each, who select their employees randomly with respect to race
from a very large pool of applicants of whom 20 percent are black. The results
cluster around a mean of 100 black employees, and as one moves farther away
from the center of the distribution-so that the black percentage becomes
increasingly far from the "expected" 200/o-the number of emplo rs
decreases. Because these data are normally distributed, one can calculate the
percentage under any part of the curve if the standard deviation of the data set
is known. If we compute the standard deviation in the case of our hypothetical
distribution of non-discriminating employers, we can then estimate the
likelihood that a randomly chosen employer will have a particular racial
composition, assuming that the null hypothesis is true.
The standard deviation is readily calculated. The formula for the
standard deviation (using the normal approximation of the binomial
distribution) is
s.d.= }np(1-p)
where n is the number of trials, andp is the probability of obtaining the result
in a given trial. In this case, n= 500 andp = 0.2, so that the standard deviation
is:
s. d.= 500 * 0.2(1 - 0.2) = 8.9
The next step is to calculate the z-score, which is the number of standard
2017] 119
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deviations by which our employer's workforce deviates from the mean:16
observed - expected
z=
s. d.
or
82 - 100
z 9 = -2.028.9
The final step is to determine the probability associated with a z-score
of +2.02. A standard probability table or online calculator reveals that the
probability associated with a z-score of ±2.02 is .043, meaning that there is
less than a five percent chance that any given non-discriminating employer
chosen at random would have this great (or greater) a deviation from the mean
if the null hypothesis is true." This probability is commonly referred to as
the "p-value."" The results would thus be "statistically significant" using the
conventional five-percent significance level, although they would not be if a
more stringent significance level of one-percent were used.1 9
6 In any normal curve, 68% of the distribution will fall within one standard deviation of the mean,
95% will fall within two standard deviations, and 99.7% will fall within three. See Figure 1. Translated to
our hypothetical distribution, that means that about 68% of randomly selecting employers would be
expected to have between 91 and 109 black employees, 95% would have between 82 and 118 black
employees, and 99.7% would have between 73 and 127 employees.
" See, e.g, David M. Lane, Normal Distribution, ONLINE STATISTICS EDUCATION: AN INTERACTIVE
MULTIMEDIA COURSES STUDY, http://onlinestatbook.com/2/calculators/normal_ dist.html (last visited
May 1, 2017). This discussion assumes that a "two-tailed test" is being used. Under a two-tailed test, the
null hypothesis is that there is no racial difference (i.e., blacks have the same probability of being hired as
whites do), and the alternative hypothesis is that the probability of being hired is different, although the
difference could run in either direction. Under a one-tailed test, the alternative hypothesis is that the
difference runs in a particular direction (e.g., blacks have a lower probability of being hired than whites).
Another way of saying this is that in a two-tailed test, the statistically significant results (5% in this case)
are distributed between the two tails of the distribution, with 2.5% in each tail. In a one-tailed test, the
significant results are confined to one tail. As a result, using atwo-tailed test, az-score of+1.96 is necessary
to declare a result statistically significant at the 5% level (hence the two-standard-deviation disparity that
many courts look for), while using a one-tailed test, az-score of only 1.65 is required, but it must be of the
previously designated sign. There is an ongoing dispute in the literature and the cases about whether a one-
tailed or two-tailed test is appropriate in this context. DAVID H. KAYE & DAVID A, FREEDMAN, Reference
Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 255-56 (3d ed. 2011).
" See CUMMING, supra note 8, at 22. Because half the employers in the hypothetical distribution with
a disparity this large would have an "excess" of blacks, the probability that an employer in this distribution
would have 82 or fewer blacks is half that amount, or .0215).
" Although the focus of this article is on binomial statistics, the same issues arise with multiple-
regression analyses. Multiple-regression analysis is often used in cases alleging discrimination in
compensation. It attempts to control for legitimate factors that are thought to contribute to salary and
determine whether, after having done so, there is still a difference between the groups, which the model
then attributes to the "dummy variable" of sex, race, etc. See KAYE & FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 279-
81. The discrimination inquiry then focuses on whether the coefficient of the dummy variable is statistically
significant, relying on the same p-values as in the binomial analysis. The quality ofthe regression analysis
rests heavily on selection of the appropriate variables. Omitting a variable that differs between the groups
of interest can lead to spurious findings of discrimination. For example, failing to include the number of
hours worked in a regression comparing annual earnings of men and women would result in any sex
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When we see an employer with a workforce demographic like our
hypothetical one, what can we say about the likelihood that something
systematic (whether discrimination or something else, such as differential
qualifications or interest) is responsible for the racial imbalance? The typical
answer provided in the case law is that a p-value of less than .05 means there
is less than a five-percent chance that the disparity was caused by chance (with
a corresponding probability of greater than 95 percent that it had a nonrandom
cause). 20  However, equating the p-value with the probability of random
selection (in other words, equating the p-value with the probability that the
null hypothesis is true) embodies the transposition fallacy.2' So, the correct
answer to the question is that by itself the p-value tells us "very little"
(although perhaps not nothing2 2) about that probability.23
Why is it an error to equate the p-value with the probability of random
selection-that is, the probability that the null hypothesis is true? The answer
gets back to what the distribution is that is described in Figure 1. It is a
distribution of employers whose workforces were assembled at random with
respect to race. That is, all of the employers represented in that distribution
had an equal probability of selecting whites and blacks; the distribution is the
distribution assumed by the null hypothesis. While the probability figure does
represent the probability of an individual non-discriminating employer
selected at random obtaining such a distribution if the null hypothesis is true,
it does not reveal the likelihood that the null hypothesis is true. Stated
otherwise, "the P value is calculated on the assumption that the null
hypothesis is true. It cannot, therefore, be a direct measure of the probability
that the null hypothesis is false." 24
B. An Illustration of the Error of the Transposition Fallacy
The lack of equivalence between the p-value and the probability of
discriminatory (or even nonrandom) selection can be easily seen by consideration
of a few hypothetical situations, with the only difference between them being the
known frequency of discrimination among employers. For ease of discussion,
we will assume that the only possible systematic cause of racial disparities is
difference in earnings that is caused by differences in hours worked to be attributed to sex. See DANIEL L.
RUBINFELD, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
303, 313-16 (3d ed. 2011).
20 See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
21 See Regina Nuzzo Scientific Method Statistical Errors, 506 NATURE 150, 151 (2014),
www.nature.com/news/scientific-method-statistical-errors-1.14700 (last visited May 1, 2017) ("Most
scientists would look at" results with a "P value of .01 and say that there was just a 1% chance of [the]
result being a false alarm. But they would be wrong. The P value cannot say this: all it can do is summarize
the data assuming a specific null hypothesis.").
' See infra Section [LIE.
2 CUMMING, supra note 8, at 28 (noting that although p is not the probability that the null is true,
"[s]urprising results may reasonably lead you to doubt the null").
24 Steven N. Goodman, Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics. 1: The P Value Fallacy, 130 ANN.
INTERN. MED. 995, 998 (1999).
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discrimination (although that is, in most cases, a highly implausible
assumption), 25 and also that all discriminating employers would have a racial
disparity that is statistically significant.
Consider the following scenario: there are 10,000 employers in a
region in which there is a fair amount of racial diversity. Obviously, the
workforces of few, if any, employers are going to match the "expected" racial
composition exactly, and some, even non-discriminating ones, would be
expected to exhibit major deviations from the statistically expected profile.
In fact, by definition, five percent (or 500) of them would be expected to have
disparities that are statistically significant at the five-percent level if they were
selecting at random. So, what is the probability that a given employer with a
statistically significant disparity obtained it by chance? If you adhere to the
transposition fallacy, the answer is always five percent. If you do not, the
answer is, "it depends on the frequency of discrimination in the population,"
as the following five scenarios reveal.26
1. Base Rate = 0. Suppose you know that no employers
discriminate (that is, the base rate of discrimination in this
population is zero). Then, the answer is-by definition-that
none of the employers with statistically significant disparities
discriminates, notwithstanding the p-value of .05; all will
have obtained the result by chance. (See Figure 2.)
Base Rate of Discrimination = 0%
% of Disparities Due to Discrimination = 0%
500
m No Disparity
* Random
a Discrimination
9500
10,000 Employers; p , 0.05
Figure 2
25 See infra Sections Ilil.A, Ill.D.
26 See infra Figure 2 in Section II.B. It is important to note that when we say "frequency of
discrimination" here we mean the frequency of employers who engage in a pattern or practice of
discrimination, not "isolated instances" of discrimination. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
336 (1977) (noting that government in a pattern or practice case must show that "racial discrimination was
the company's standard operating procedure - the regular rather than the unusual practice" and that it must
"prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or .. . sporadic discriminatory acts").
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2. Base Rate = .01. What if, instead, you know that one
percent of employers discriminate? Then, there will be 100
disparities due to discrimination (1% of 10,000) and 495 due
to chance (5% of the remaining 9900). So, in this example,
16.9% (100/595) of the observed disparities will be caused
by discrimination. (See Figure 3.)
Base Rate of Discrimination = 1%
% of Disparities Due to Discrimination = 16.8%
495 100
' No Disparity
* Random
a Discrimination
Figure 3
3. Base Rate = .05. What if, instead, five percent of
employers discriminate? Then, 500 of them will have
obtained their disparities through discrimination, and 475
(5% of the remaining 9500) will have obtained their
disparities by chance. Now, the likelihood that an employer
with a statistically significant discrepancy obtained it through
discrimination is 500/975 or 51.3%-more likely than not
(barely) but a far cry from the 95% figure that the
transposition fallacy would suggest. (See Figure 4.)
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Base Rate of Discrimination = 5%
% of Disparities Due to Discrimination = 51.3%
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4. Base Rate = .10. Suppose ten percent of employers
discriminate. Then, 1,000 (10%) will have disparities due to
discrimination, and 5% of the remaining 9,000 (450) will
have disparities due to chance, such that 69% of employers
with disparities will have obtained them through
discrimination. (See Figure 5.)
Base Rate of Discrimination = 10%
% of Disparities Due to Discrimination 69%
1000
450 L No Disparity
a Random
* Discrimination
5. Base Rate = .50. Finally, suppose that half of all
employers engage in systematic racial discrimination. Now,
8550
10000 us pS0.05
Figure 5
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5,000 employers would have statistically significant
disparities from discrimination, and 250 employers (5% of
the remaining 5000) would have disparities caused by
chance. Only now-with an assumption that half of all
employers systematically discriminate-does the percentage
of disparities due to nonrandom factors (95.3%) approximate
the percentage assumed under the transposition fallacy, and
that is just by happenstance.27 (See Figure 6.)
Base Rate of Discrimination = 50%
% of Disparities Due to Discrimination = 95.2%
47S : No Disparityb 47St)a Random
~ ~ p pr *,Discrimination
250
10,000 Employers; p & 0.05
Figure 6
In all five scenarios, the p-value supplied by NHST is the same-the
conventional .05 level. Yet, as we can see, the probability supplied by the p-
value has virtually no relationship to the probability that a given employer
with a statistically significant disparity obtained that disparity by chance. 28
Moreover, in real life, of course, there will be many additional disparities that
are due to systematic, yet nondiscriminatory, causes, such as differential
27 These figures assume that any discrimination could run in either direction; i.e., either favoring
whites or favoring blacks, which is the assumption of the two-tailed test. Only one-half of the disparities
described above would disadvantage blacks if a two-tailed test is used. If a one-tailed test is used, then all
of the disparities would disadvantage blacks.
2' There is a more formal way to calculate the probabilities incorporating the base-rate of
discrimination into the analysis, and that is to use Bayesian analysis, which does not rest on the
transposition fallacy. See generally Jason R. Bent, Hidden Priors: Toward a Unifying Theory of Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law, 91 DENVER U. L. REv. 807 (2014); see generally Deborah M. Weiss, The
Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 1677 (2011). There are a number of
problems with that approach, however, including the impossibility of ascertaining the base rate, as well as
the inappropriateness of basing an employer's liability on estimates of the rate of wrongdoing of other
employers. See Kingsley R. Browne, No Bayesian Solution to the Transposition Fallacy (manuscript on
file with the author) (arguing that use of base rates of discrimination runs afoul of Rule 404 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
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qualifications or interest.2 9
C. The Pervasiveness of the Transposition Fallacy
That courts occasionally make errors in their interpretation of
statistics is not remarkable or even terribly concerning. What is both
remarkable and concerning is the fact that, whenever a court explains with
any precision what ap-value means, it is virtually always wrong, as the many
cases cited herein attest. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently explained
that "a threshold of two standard deviations corresponds roughly to a 95%
confidence level or a .05 level of significance, i.e., there is only a 5%
probability that the result is due to chance."30 Similarly, according to the
Seventh Circuit, "two standard deviations is normally enough to show that it
is extremely unlikely (that is, there is less than a 5% probability) that the
disparity is due to chance, giving rise to a reasonable inference that the hiring
was not race-neutral" 3 ' The Third Circuit has declared that "[p]robability
29 One response to the transposition fallacy argument in discrimination cases is "why [should] the
legal system ... conclude that base-rate discrimination is especially rare"? ZIMMER ET AL, 8th ed., supra
note 15, at 135. That argument misses the point. The point is not that discrimination is more or less rare
than a particular person might assume but rather that the presumed meaning of the p-value is absolutely
incorrect. A p-value of .05 equates to the 95% chance of discrimination that the transposition fallacy
suggests only if the prevalence of systemic discrimination just happens to be about 50%. Yet, the 5%
significance level was not adopted based on any particular assumption about base rates of discrimination
but rather because it is a traditional significance level used in the social sciences that is erroneously believed
to supply the probability of random selection.
30 Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F. 3d 149, 156 n. 9 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691
F.3d 1184, 1197 (10th Cir. 2012) ("The odds of such a difference occurring [by chance] can be referred to
as the probability, or p-value."); King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 37 (Neb. Sup.
Ct. 2009) ("A significance level of .05 presents a 5-percent probability that researchers observed an
association because of chance variations."); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 156 n.23
(N.D. Cal. 2004) ("The standard deviation is a number that quantifies the probability that chance is
responsible for any difference between an expected outcome and the observed outcome. . . ."); Wynn v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1124 n.47 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("Generally, a statistical study is
viewed as statistically significant ifthe probability that the result is attributable to chance alone is less than
I out of 20." (citation omitted)).
' Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 424 (7th Cir. 2000); see id. at 427 ("The difference
was statistically significant in six of those 12 categories, in the sense that there was a small (less than 5%)
probability that the difference was due to chance."). See also Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364,372
n. 13 (3d Cir. 2011) ("The standard deviation calculation measures how likely it is that a deviant result
occurred by chance." (quoting Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1232 n.17 (3d Cir. 1992))); Smith v.
Xerox, 196 F.3d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1999) ("If an obtained result varies from the expected result by two
standard deviations, there is only about a 5% probability that the variance is due to chance."); Peightal v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1556 n.16 (lth Cir. 1994) ("[S]ocial scientists consider a
finding of two standard deviations significant, meaning there is about one chance in 20 that the explanation
for the deviation could be random and the deviation must be accounted for by some factor other than
chance." (quoting Waisome v. Port Authority, 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir.1991))); Jones v. Pepsi-Cola
Metro. Bottling Co., 871 F. Supp. 305, 309 n.10 (ED. Mich. 1994) ("Standard deviations are a
measurement of the probability that a result is a random deviation from the predicted result"); Ottaviani
v. State U. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1989) ("A finding of two standard deviations
corresponds approximately to a one in twenty, or five percent, chance that a disparity is merely a random
deviation from the norm . . . ."); Smith v. City of Boston, 144 F. Supp. 3d 177, 192 (D. Mass., 2015)
(stating that if the "mean test scores of minority candidates were located 1.96 standard deviations away
from the overall mean, there would be only a 5% probability that such difference was due to chance"); see
also Browne, Beyond Damned Lies, supra note 5, at 491-92 nn. 46-47 (citing additional cases). Cf Tagatz
v. Marquette, 861 F.2d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 1988) (In Tagatz, Judge Posner hedged about the meaning of
the p-value: "One of Dr. Tagatz's tables comparing salary raises for Catholic and for non-Catholic faculty
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levels (also called 'p-values') are simply the probability that the observed
disparity is random-the result of chance fluctuation or distribution. For
example, a 0.05 probability level means that . . . there is only a five percent
chance that the disparity is random."3 2 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has stated
that results that are statistically significant at the .05 level mean that "it could
be said with a 95% certainty that the outcome was not merely a fluke."33
Sometimes the significance level is equated to the risk of "Type I error" (false
positives), a form of reasoning that also entails the transposition fallacy.34 But
to say that the p-value represents the likelihood that the result is a "fluke" or
the likelihood of a Type I error is to say that it represents the probability that
the null hypothesis is true, which it simply does not.
Some courts have gone even farther, stating not just that the p-value
establishes the probability that chance was the cause of a disparity, but also
that it strongly bears on (or even equals) the probability that the employer did
not discriminate. For example, in Adams v. Ameritech Services, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit stated: "If the observed percentage of African-American hires
is only 20%, then the statistician will compute the 'standard deviation' from
the expected norm and indicate how likely it is that race played no part in the
decisionmaking."" Similarly, in Matthews v. Waukesha County, the court
stated that "[s]tatisticians typically calculate the standard deviation from the
norm to determine the likelihood that race played no role in a decision." 6
And in Dobbs- Weinstein v. Vanderbilt University, the court stated that "[t]wo
standard deviations translates, approximately, into a one in twenty, or five
percent (.05), chance that a particular disparity is due to chance, and not to a
particular factor such as sex."37 Even expert witnesses testify in the same,
in the school of education reveals a difference (favoring the Catholics) that is significant at the .0048 level.
This means [speaking very crudely (see Kruskal, Tests ofSignificance, in 2 Int'l Encyclopedia of Statistics
944, 957 (1978))] that there is a probability of less than 5 in 1,000 that the difference is due to chance").
"Speaking very crudely," indeed. Id.
32 Stagi v. AMTRAK 391 Fed. App'x 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d
1206, 1223 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Statistical significance measures the likelihood that the disparity between
groups is random, i.e., solely the result of chance.").
33 Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 545 n.22 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Anderson v.
Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1308 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994) ("There is just a little more than one
chance in a thousand that D&L's hiring during the Grizzard years happened by chance-2.4 standard
deviations."). In the District Court's massive opinion in Vuyanich v. Republic Nat 'I Bank of Dallas, 505 F.
Supp. 224, 347-48 (N.D. Tex. 1980), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073
(1984), the court noted in passing that "[a] test of statistical significance does not determine the probability
that any particular result in fact occurred by chance," but there is no indication that this observation played
a role in the court's analysis of the statistical evidence, since the court also referred to disparities that were
significant at the 5-percent level as "apparently discriminatory results," without explaining why the results
would appear discriminatory if the 5-percent level is not the probability of chance occurrence.
' See, e.g., Richard Goldstein, Two Types ofStatistical Errors in Employment Discrimination Cases,
26 JURIMETRICS J. 32, 38 (1985) (stating that "one could set the significance level (probability of Type I
error) at .05"); ZIMMER ET AL., 8th ed., supra note 15, at 135 ("Setting the level of significance at 0.05
means that a Type I error is made in only 5 percent of the cases, that is, 5 in 100 times.").
3 231 F.3d at 424 (emphasis added).
36 937 F. Supp. 2d 975, 986 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (emphasis added).
3 I F. Supp. 2d 783, 803-04 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (emphasis added); see also Capaci v. Katz &
Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 1983) (characterizing the p-value as the "probability ofunbiased
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vein.3 Some courts will describe the meaning of the p-value both correctly
and incorrectly in the same passage, not realizing that they are saying two
different things.39  Although the focus of this article is the prevalence of the
transposition fallacy in employment discrimination cases, the fallacy is a
staple of other civil cases as well.40
hiring" (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984); Ivy v. Meridian Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 641
F. Supp. 157, 165 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (stating that "a fluctuation of two or three standard deviations indicates
that the result is caused by discriminatory intent rather than chance"); Hameed v. Iron Workers Local 396,
637 F.2d 506, 513 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that "[i]ftests of statistical significance eliminate chance as a
likely explanation for the differential pass rates, courts will presume that the disparate pass rates are
attributable to racially discriminatory selection criteria" (emphasis added)); Kassman v. KPMG LLP,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93022, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) (stating that sex disparities "are statistically
significant at more than eleven standard deviations, meaning that the probability that KPMG s
compensation could be gender neutral is less than one in one hundred million" (emphasis added)); EEOC
v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1191 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[t]o the extent the probability
of chance is shown to be quite small, the legal inference of discrimination based upon a rough legal
assessment that disparities are manifestly 'gross' or 'substantial' is thus 'scientifically' confirmed")
(emphasis added).
3 See, e.g., Declaration of Jie Chen, Ph.D., at *6, Lang v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. 99-
0463-CV-W-SOW, 1999 WL 34767779 (W.D. Mo. 1999) ("Because the computed value of the chi-square
is larger than the critical value, and the computedp-value of this test (0.000) is far less than the significance
level (.05), we must conclude that the variables of race and job category are dependent. In other words,
KCPL is using race as afactor in deciding which employee to place in a managerial position." (emphasis
added)); Report or Affidavit of Chieh-Chen Bowen, Ph.D., at *2, Siegel v. Inverness Med. Innovations,
Inc., No. 09CV01791, 2010 WL 2798170 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2010) ("The probability that this data pattern
happened by chance (i.e. the RIF decisions were made without considering employees'age) was only .036
which was a very low probability event" (emphasis added)); Affidavit of Frank B. Martin, Ph.D., at *25,
Thomforde v. IBM Corp., No. 02-CV-4817 JNE/FLN, 2006 WL 6578917 (D. Minn. Mar. 8,2006) ("This
is highly statistically significant with a p-value of less than .00001. What this means is the probability that
this occurred as a result ofa drawing blind to age is less than one in 100,000." (emphasis added)); Report
or Affidavit of Dr. Patricia L. Pacey, Ph.D., Camara v. Matheson Trucking, No. 12-cv-03040-CMA-CBS,
2013 WL 10236727 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2013) ("The statistical test result is presented as a probability value
("p-value"), i.e., the probability that the observed difference between the average black and non-black
hours (or, African and non-African hours) is a random event (i.e., due to chance) vis-a-vis disparate
treatment" (emphasis added)); Expert Report of Burt S. Barnow, Ph.D., EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., No.
00CV02923, 2005 WL 6581866 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 2005), ("I report the probability AutoZone would
have hired the number of Blacks or women actually observed ifthe firm was hiringfairly ..... (emphasis
added)).
39 For example, one district court described the meaning of the p-value as follows:
When a statistician computes thep-value for any set of data, he or she is determining
the probability of getting, just by chance, test data as extreme as the actual data
obtained, given that the null hypothesis is true .... A "null hypothesis" is the
hypothesis that there is no difference between two groups from which samples are
drawn. For example, the null hypothesis in this case would be that there is no
difference between Indiana Bell employees who are under forty and those forty or
more in terms of the criteria used to select them for termination. Thus, ifthe selection
rates found in samples of the two age groups at Indiana Bell are not the same, then
the p-value would give the probability that this data resulted from "the luck of the
draw." Large p-values are consistent with the null hypothesis, and small p-values
undermine the hypothesis . . . . However, p does not express anything about the
accuracy of the null hypothesis, or the probability that it is true. Rather, it is
computed by assuming the hypothesis is true.
Allard v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 1 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (first emphasis added).
Except for the italicized sentence, the court correctly stated the meaning of the p-value, and, in fact,
specifically disclaims the fallacy in the last two sentences. Right in the middle, however, is the italicized
sentence clearly embodying the transposition fallacy, a sentence that is explicitly contradicted just two
sentences later.
' See, e.g., In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 13576, at *12
(E.D. Pa. 2011) ("The p-value was .08, which means that there is a 92% likelihood that the difference
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Judges seem to come by their misconceptions about the meaning of
p-values honestly, because expert witnesses routinely mislead them, whether
intentionally or not, probably more the latter than the former. Expert reports
and testimony embodying the transposition fallacy are legion.4 1 In their
between the two groups was not the result of mere chance."); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab.
Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1236 n.1 (W.D. Wash. 2003) ("P-values measure the probability that the
reported association was due to chance...."); NovoNordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceut Lab., 775 F. Supp.
2d 985, 1018 n.20 (E.D. Mich., 2011) ("The p-value is avalue that statisticians use to show the uncertainty
in the results of a study. Values of 0.05 or less mean that there is 5 percent or less likelihood that the
outcome is the result of pure chance."); Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharma. Lab., 719 F.3d 1346, 1350
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("The p-value is a value that statisticians use to show the level of uncertainty in a
study's results. A p-value is 'statistically significant' if it is 0.05 or less, which indicates that there is 5%
or less likelihood that the outcome was the result of pure chance (citation omitted)); Acorda Therapeutics,
Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc., No. CV 14-882-LPS, 2017 WL 1199767, at *37 n.10 (D. Del., Mar. 31,
2017) (citing expert witness's testimony that a p-value of 0.14 indicates "a 14% likelihood that the
measured result was due to chance"); In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liability
Litigation, No. 14-C-1748, MDL No. 2545, 2017 WL 1833173, at *4 (N.D. Ill., May 8,2017) (noting that
a result "would be considered statistically significant if there is a 95% probability, also expressed as a "p-
value" of <0.05, that the observed association is not the product of chance"); In re PTC Therapeutics, Inc.
Securities Litigation, Civ. No. 16-1124 (KM) (MA1), 2017 WL 3705801, at *16 n.4 (D. N.J., Aug. 28,
2017) (stating that "a p-value of 0.05 means that there is a 5% likelihood that an occurrence was the result
of chance alone"); In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 166 F. Supp. 3d 501, 508 (D.N.J. 2016) (equating
thep-value with the probability of a false positive).
41 See, e.g, Report or Affidavit of Kyle E. Brink, Ph.D., Smith v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:11 cv 00345-
TJC, 2013 WL 10154736 (M.D. Fla. Oct 7,2013) ("[I]f the p-value resulting from the statistical test is less than
.05, then there is less than a 5% probability that the difference is due to chance. Conversely, you can conclude that
there is a 95% probability that the difference is not due to chance."); Statistical Analysis and Report of Richard F.
Tonowski, EEOC v. TEPRO, No. 4:12-cv-00075, 2014 WL 7778496 (E.D. Tenn. May 9, 2014) ("The 1-test at
the bottom of Exhibit 2 establishes that the probability of an age difference between the groups having occurred
by chance alone is less than I in 10,000."); Report or Affidavit of Dr. Patricia L. Pacey, Ph.D., Camara v.
Matheson Trucking, No. I2-cv-03040-CMA-CBS, 2013 WL 10236727 (D. Colo. Sept 27,2013) ("The statistical
test result is presented as a probability value ("p-value"), i.e., the probability that the observed difference between
the average black and non-black hours (or, African and non-African hours) is a random event (i.e., due to chance)
vis-A-vis disparate treatment"); Analysis of Hiring and Economic Damages of Dr. Robert Martin LaJeunesse,
M.A., Ph.D., B.S.B.A., EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., No. 310CV03095, 2013 WL 10104409 (D.N.J. Aug, 15, 2013)
("The Z-score for this period of -9.16 indicates that the aggregate shortfall is statistically significant, and that there
is effectively zero probability that this outcome could have occurred by chance (p-value 0)."); Discrimination
Analysis Addendum of Dr. Mark S. McNulty, B.S., Ph.D., EEOC v. JBS USA, LLC, No. I l0CV02103, 2013
WL 10871078 (D. Colo. Jul. 23, 2013) ("The statistical test result is presented as a probability value, i.e., the
probability that the observed differences in the rates at which disciplinary terminations are taken by Swift is due
to chance."); Declaration of Dwight D. Steward, Ph.D., in Support of Plaintiffs Reply Brief re Motion for Class
Certification, Ordonez v. Radio Shack, No. CV 10-07060 CAS (JCGx), 2012 WL 8964096 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19,
2012) ("The probability that the difference was generated by random chance is referred to as a probability value
or p-value for short"); Report or Affidavit of Robert M. LaJeunesse, PhD., EEOC v. Presrite, No. 1 1-cv-00260,
2012 WL 7075122 (N.D. Ohio June 28, 2012) ("Although the p-values for the pooled result shown in Table 14
are greater than zero, they are well below the critical significance level of 5 percent. The interpretation of the small
p-values is that the probability that this hiring outcome occurred by chance is far below five, or even one,
percent."); First Expert Report of Dr. Steven Wolfson, Caldwell v. University of Houston, No. 11CV02014, 2011
WL 8190124 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 29,2011) ("At this level of statistical significance, we can be 95% sure of our result,
or a one in twenty (1:20) chance of being incorrect, the so-called level of confidence."); Declaration and Expert
Opinion of Dr. Venkareddy Chennareddy, Moses v. Dodaro, No. 06-1712 (EGS), 2011 WL 6442182 (D.D.C.
Sept. 1, 2011) ("[T]he conclusion that those over 50 years old compared to those in 40-50 years old were
discriminately impacted based on age stereotype-bias, being wrong is almost zero or has a chance of only 2.2 out
of 1000."); Expert Report of Stan V. Smith, Ph.D., Bolden v. Walsh Group, No. 106CV04104, 2010 WL 8585380
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2010) ("Moreover, this difference is statistically significant at the .01% level ... meaning that
there is a less than I in 10,000 chance that this difference can be explained by random chance."); Report or
Affidavit of Chieh-Chen Bowen, Ph.D., Siegel v. Inverness Medical Innovations, Inc., No. 09CV01791, 2010
WL 2798170 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7,2010) ("The probability that this data pattern happened by chance (i.e. the RIF
decisions were made without considering employees' age) was only .036 which was a very low probability
event"); Videotaped Deposition of Nitin Paranjpe, Ph.D., Allen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 2:07-CV-1 1706,
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opinions, many courts claim to be repeating what they have been told by
experts, 42 although one never knows for sure whether a paraphrase of expert
2010 WL 7023485 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2010) ("And my statistical test is saying what's the p-value, what's the
probability that those disparities we saw purely happened accidentally by randomness. It's very small, .022. So
we rule out chance as an explanation for the disparity."); Corrections to the Reply Report of Louis R. Lanier,
EEOC v. Bloomberg, No. 07 CV 8383 (LAP) (HP), 2010 WL 2103147 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,2010) ("Typically, in
the economics professional literature, standard deviations of approximately 2 [sic] or greater in absolute value
(1.96, to be more precise) are considered statistically significant, representing a five percent level of probability
(I in 20) that the tested result occurred by chance."); Declaration of Kyle Brink, Ph.D., Howe v. City of Akron,
No. 5:06 CV 2779,2008 WL 8568234 (N.D. Ohio Sept 6,2008) (If the p-value resulting from the statistical test
is less than .05, then there is less than a 5% probability that the difference is due to chance. Conversely, you can
conclude that there is a 95% probability that the difference is not due to chance.); Report or Affidavit of James R.
Lackritz, Ph.D., Terry v. City of San Diego, No. 06CV01459, 2008 WL 8698107 (S.D. Cal. Sept 22, 2008) ("The
p-value of .000 means the probability of seeing this female/male distribution between the LGI and higher
classifications is .000 when rounded to the third decimal place, or virtually impossible. Any probability lower
than .05 is considered to be too low to believe that the difference in these distributions are merely due to random
chance."); Report or Affidavit of Stan V. Smith, Ph.D., Derrico v. MGM Grand Detroit LLC, No. 03CV73133,
2007 WL 6519719 (E.D. Mich. Oct 15, 2007) ("[T]he chance that so many Black employees were demoted
based solely on a random selection is approximately three in one billion."); Affidavit of Kurt V. Krueger, Ph.D.,
Johnson v. United States Beef Corp., No. 04:04-CV-00963-FJG, 2006 WL 3861830 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7,2006)
("The Fisher's Exact p-value is p= ... .05 which indicates a probability value of 5% that the differences in racial
composition between the Arby's store and that of the comparable labor force in Lee's Summit occurred by
chance."); Affidavit of Frank B. Martin, Ph.D., Thomforde v. IBM Corp., No. 02-CV-4817 JNE/FLN, 2006 WL
6578917 (D. Minn. Mar. 8,2006) ("This is highly statistically significant with a p-value of less than.00001. What
this means is the probability that this occurred as a result of a drawing blind to age is less than one in 100,000.");
Report or Affidavit of J. Michael Hardin, Ph.D., U.S. v. Jefferson County, No. CV-75-S-0666-S, 2005 WL
6000850 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2005) ("Using this convention of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is less than a
pre-set value such as .05 leads to a decision rule that assures the analyst that the mistake of rejecting the null
hypothesis when it is actually true (called a Type I error) will only occur with probability of .05."); Expert Report
of Dr. Kathleen K. Lundquist, U.S. v. Jefferson County, No. CV-75-S-0666-S, 2005 WL 6000852 (N.D. Ala.
Feb. 7, 2005) ("Using the Fisher's Exact Probability Test results in a probability value (i.e., p-value) which
indicates the likelihood that the observed differences in selection rates occurred by chance alone."); Expert Report
of Ali Saad, Ph.D. (defense expert), Sepulveda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 204CV 1003, 2004 WL 5389362
(C.D. Cal. 2004) ("[A .05] level of statistical significance is equivalent to saying that there is less than a one in
twenty chance that the observed relationship is due to chance."); Expert Report ofJames W. Meeker, J.D., Ph.D.,
Deja Vu-Toledo, Inc. v. City of Toledo, No. 3:03CV7245, 2004 WL 5740201 (N.D. Ohio July 20,2004) ("This
error rate states we are 95 per cent confident the effect detected is a real effect, not an artifact of the sample.");
Expert Trial Transcript of Mark Berman, NAACP v. Florida Department of Corrections, No. 5:00-v-100-OC-
IOGRJ, 2003 WL 24296516 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2003) ("[W]ith the 'P' value of 02, 1 can say that I'm 98 percent
sure that the result I came up with did not happen as a consequence of chance."); Brief of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs Appellants and Reversal, Cooper v. Southem
Co., 390 F.3d 695 (1 1 Cir. 2004) (quoting expert as testifying with respect to a racial difference in promotions,
"The probability that this racial difference could have occurred by chance is less than 26 in ten trillion");
Declaration of Jie Chen, Ph.D., Lang v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. 99-0463-CV-W-SOW, 1999 WL
34767779 (W.D. Mo. 1999) ("My standard for choosing the significance level for hypothesis testing of the data
is .05, This means that the results of this testing have a 95% probability of being accurate, and only a 5% chance
of error"); Opinions and Report of Bill Luker, Jr., Ph.D., Bolton v. Lear Seating Corp., No. 97-C-392-C, 1998
WL 35074551 (W.D. Wis. June 1, 1998) ("'[P] = .0026' indicates that the probability that this difference arose
merely by chance is less than 1 percent, and so on through the rest of the tests."); Declaration ofJie Chen, Ph.D.,
Tumer v. Torotel, Inc., No. 96-0646-CV-W-5, 1996 WL 34388584 (W.D. Mo., Oct 29,1996) ("My standard for
choosing the significance level for hypothesis testing of the Torotel data is .05. This means that the results of this
testing have a 95% probability of being accurate, and only a 5% chance of error."); see also Report of Richard
Drogin, Ph.D., McClain v. Lufkin Industries, No. 97CV00063, 2003 WL 25859212 (E.D. Tex. June 16, 2003)
("If the race coefficient is statistically significant, the disparity cannot be explained by chance variation and the
coefficient indicates a real difference between black and non-black pay rates.").
2 See Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 371 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Additionally, plaintiffs
produced a statistical expert who testified that the probability that the disparate retention rate was due to
some random factor unrelated to age was .0084."); Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1031
(8th Cir. 1986) ("[Plaintiffs' expert] testified that the chances were two in one thousand that age was not a
factor in the terminations."); EEOC v. Olson's Dairy Queens, Inc., 989 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Dr.
Straszheim concluded that the likelihood that [the] observed hiring patterns resulted from truly race-neutral
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testimony is faithful to the original, and it is easy to inadvertently paraphrase
a statement that correctly states the meaning of the p-value into a statement
that embodies the transposition fallacy. The ambiguity about the origin of the
misunderstanding is demonstrated in Brackett v. Civil Service Commission,43
in which the court quoted the plaintiff's statistician as follows:
Statisticians measure how far away an actual outcome is from
what's expected in statistical units called standard deviations.
A standard deviation of two approximately corresponds to a
probability of occurrence of five percent.
Putting aside the nonsense about "a standard deviation of two"-when (one
hopes) the expert meant "two standard deviations," a very different animal-
it is not clear whether the testimony embodies the fallacy because the
statement refers vaguely to "a probability of occurrence" but doesn't say the
probability of what occurrence. The statement could mean, correctly, that the
probability that a nondiscriminating employer chosen at random from a pool
of nondiscriminating employers would have a disparity that great or greater
is five percent, or it could mean, incorrectly, that the probability that an
employer with this great a disparity was selecting randomly is five percent.
In any event, the court immediately followed the expert's quotation with a
quotation from another case, which clearly rests on the fallacy: "Two standard
deviations is normally enough to show that it is extremely unlikely (that is,
there is less than a 5% probability) that the disparity is due to chance, giving
rise to a reasonable inference that the hiring was not race-neutral." The court
later paraphrased additional testimony by the same expert as asserting "that a
shortfall of 16.2 women was significant and corresponded to a statistical
disparity of 3.14 standard deviations, meaning that there was approximately
a one in 600 probability that such occurrence had happened by chance,"45
another statement that embodies the fallacy. Perhaps the expert's testimony
itself did not explicitly embody the transposition fallacy, but it does not seem
that the expert worked very hard to prevent the court from lapsing into it.
Another example of the difficulty that courts have keeping the matter
straight can be found in the District Court's opinion in Bazile v. City of
Houston." The court quoted the plaintiff s expert's report as follows:
Statistical tests produce a probability value ... that determines
or estimates the probability of obtaining the sample result
hiring practices was less than one chance in ten thousand."); People v. Washington, 179 P.3d 153, 163
(Colo. App. 2007) (discussing the defendant's argument that there was discrimination in jury selection,
stating that defendant's expert "opined that the probability of the .3% disparity being attributable to chance
was .008% (or eight chances in 100,000")).
4 850 N.E.2d 533, 543 n.14 (Mass. 2006).
* Id. (quoting Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 424 (7th Cir. 2000)).
4 Id. at 549.
* 858 F. Supp. 2d 718 (S.D. Tex., 2012).
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assuming there were no differences in the population.... For
example, if an alpha level of .05 is chosen and the [probability
value] resulting from the statistical test is less than .05, then
there is less than a 5% probability that the difference is due to
chance (i.e., there is less than a 5% probability of making a Type
I error) and we say the result is statistically significant.
Conversely, you can conclude that there is a 95% probability
that the difference is not due to chance.4 7
The first sentence is a correct statement of the meaning of the p-value: the
likelihood of the result if the null hypothesis is true. The remainder of the
quotation reflects the transposition fallacy: the p-value is the probability that
the result is due to chance (and therefore the probability that the null
hypothesis is true).
The United States Supreme Court has not been spared such
arguments, although it has not engaged in the fallacy itself. In Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc., v. Siracusano,48 a brief filed on behalf of a pair of self-
described "statistics experts" asserted the following:
The 5 percent significance rule insists on 19 to 1 odds that
the measured effect is real. There is, however, a practical
need to keep wide latitude in the odds of uncovering a real
effect, which would therefore eschew any bright-line
standard of significance. Suppose that a p-value for a
particular test comes in at 9 percent. Should this p-value be
considered "insignificant" in practical, human, or economic
terms? We respectfully answer, "No." For a p-value of .09,
the odds of observing the AER [adverse event report] is 91
percent divided by 9 percent. Put differently, there are 10-to-
I odds that the adverse effect is "real" (or about a 1 in 10
chance that it is not). Odds of 10-to-i certainly deserve the
attention of responsible parties if the effect in question is a
terrible event.4 9
Fortunately, the Supreme Court did not specifically address that point in its
opinion, although it did make a couple of unfortunate observations about
4 Id. at 738 (alteration in original).
* 563 U.S. 27 (2011). Matrix presented the question whether plaintiffs can state a claim for securities
fraud based upon a pharmaceutical company's failure to disclose adverse event reports even "if the reports
do not disclose a statistically significant number of adverse events." Id. at 29 (holding that plaintiffs could
state such a claim. In fact, however, "[b]ecause case reports are just a series of anecdotes, it is not
immediately obvious how they could be statistically significant." David H. Kaye, The Transposition
Fallacy in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano: Part I, FORENSIC Sa., STATS. & LAW (2011), http://for-
sci-law.blogspot.com/2011/08/one-might-expect-to-hear-phrases-like.html (last visited May 1, 2017).
4 Brief of Amici Curiae Statistics Experts Professors Deirdre N. McCloskey and Stephen T. Ziliak in
Support of Respondents, at *18, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 2010 WL 4657930.
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statistics and causation.so
Plaintiffs' lawyers have an obvious incentive to perpetuate the
transposition fallacy." One might suppose that defense lawyers and their
experts would be standing ready to disabuse courts of their embrace of the
fallacy, but such does not seem to be the case.5 2 I have been unable to find a
single reported case in which such an objection was mentioned in an
opinion." Indeed, it is not clear that defense experts are any less likely to
lapse into the fallacy than anyone else.54
Surely, one might think, at least the fallacy must be well-understood
by all scholars of law and statistics. There again, the answer is no. One finds
' See Nathan A. Schachtman, Statistical Evidence in Products Liability Litigation, in PRODUCT
LIABrITY LITIGATION: CURRENT LAW, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES (Stephanie A. Scharf, Lise T.
Spacapan, Traci M. Braun, & Sarah R. Marmor, eds.) 30A-9 - A-12 (2014) (noting that the Court in dictum
made comments about the lack of need for statistically significant evidence of causation in pharmaceutical
cases that are inconsistent with current law.
" See Steven Rotman, Don't Know Much About Epidemiology? Gain a Strategic Advantage in
Pharmaceutical Litigation by Boning up on Epidemiology, 43 AM. Ass'N FOR JUSTICE, at 35 (2007)
(stating that p-values "measure the probability that a reported association between a drug and condition
was due to chance. A P value of .05, which is generally considered the standard for statistical significance,
means there is a 5 percent probability the association was due to chance"); Christine E. Webber, A
Plaintiffs Perspective on Some Evidentiary Issues and Jury Instructions in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, ABA BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. (2008) (providing a "sample jury instruction" stating, "[a]t
1.96 standard deviation [sic], there is no more than a 5% chance that the pay differences found would arise
solely by chance. In other words, one can be 95% certain that there really is a difference in how the groups
being studied are compensated"[;] the instruction also tells the jury, "No minimum degree of disparity or
statistical significance must be met to establish a claim of discrimination.").
52 See Bruce R. Parker & Anthony F. Vittoria, Debunking Junk Science: Techniques for Effective Use
ofBiostatistics, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 33, 44 (2002) ("[A] P value of .01 means the researcher can be 99
percent sure that the result was not due to chance.").
" There are a few unreported cases in which the expert mentioned the transposition-fallacy argument.
See Report of James T. McClave, Ph.D., U.S. v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:12-cy-451-J-32 MCR, 2014
WL 7778588 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 14, 2014) ("Drs. Brink's and Siskin's conclusory statements about the
probability the disparity is due to chance is known as the 'fallacy of the transposed conditional' . . . . Instead
of correctly concluding that a statistically significant result means that the disparity would be unlikely to
have occurred . . . assuming that chance is the cause, they concluded that they know the probability of
cause being the chance having observed a particular disparity. In fact, the test result does [not] provide
that probability."); Amended Expert Report of Richard McCleary, Ph.D., McGuire v. City of Montgomery,
No. 2:11-CV-1027-WKW, 2014 WL 8096111 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 7, 2014) ("Finally, in §5.3, 1 discuss
Bayesian inverse probabilities. Misinterpretations of statistical significance usually confuse the
significance level (or p-value) of a hypothesis test with the Bayesian inverse probability of the hypothesis.
Since the p-value and corresponding Bayesian inverse probability are not generally equal, this is a serious
error."); Videotaped Deposition of Franklin M. Fisher, U.S. ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., No. 04
C 6074, 2006 WL 3039354 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2006) ("But the P value is not the probability that the null
hypothesis is false, nor is it the probability that the null hypothesis is true. It's the probability of obtaining
the results you've obtained ifthe null hypothesis is true.") (False Claims Act case); Affidavit of Joseph B.
Kadane, Ph.D., Hall v. Best Buy Co., No. 04-4812 (MID/JGL), 2006 WL 6610712 (D. Minn. June 29,
2006) ("A well-recognized danger of the use of tests of significance is that they invite the unwary reader,
juror or judge to confuse the probability of the data as or more extreme than that observed if the null
hypothesis were true (which is a legitimate conclusion from a test of significance) with the probability that
the null hypothesis is true, given the data (which is not a legitimate conclusion from this method).")).
' See, e.g., Clark v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 885 F. Supp. 694, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating
that "[tihe parties further agree that under the Fisher's Exact Test, there was a .0194 probability that the
disparity in selection rates between black and white employees who had passed the exam was due to
random chance. . . "); Delgado-O'Neil v. City of Minneapolis, 745 F. Supp. 2d 894, 911 (D. Minn. 2010)
(stating that "both experts agreed that the standard for finding statistical significance is a p-value
(probability value) of .05 or less (a I in 20 chance that the event occurred by chance)").
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ample occurrences of the fallacy in both books" and journal articles 6 dealing
with employment discrimination and statistics.
Perhaps one should not condemn too strongly those in the legal field
who fail to understand techniques that are not, for most of them, central to
their specialty. Studies of academic psychologists, for many of whom null-
hypothesis significance testing is their bread and butter, also find widespread
misunderstanding of the meaning of p-values, such that large percentages of
students and researchers (even those who teach statistics) cannot correctly
answer basic questions on the subject." As psychologist Geoff Cumming
asks, "If a technique is not even understood correctly by its teachers, what
5 JOEL FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 342 (9th
Ed. 2013) ("[T]he standard deviation is a way to calculate the likelihood that chance is responsible for the
difference between a predicted result and an actual result."); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 67,67 (4th Ed. 2012) ("[T]he binomial
model provides a statistical means for determining whether the observed outcomes are likely to be the
product of chance (the "null hypothesis)."); MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 347,
344-49 (1987) (stating that if the p-value is .04, "we are 96% sure that the result did not occur by chance
. . ."); cf DIANNE KRUMM, PSYCHOLOGY AT WORK: AN INTRODUCTION TO
INDUSTRIAL/ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 546, 546 (2001) (stating that "[t]he .05 significance level
means that the probability is 95 percent that the results of an experiment are caused by the experimental
manipulations and are not due to chance"); DAVID BALDUS & JAMES COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF
DISCRIMINATION § 9.02, at 290 (1980) ("A finding that a disparity is statistically significant at the 0.05 or
0.01 level means that there is a 5 per cent. or I per cent probability, respectively, that the disparity is due
to chance"); see also Browne, Beyond Damned Lies, supra note 5, at 493-94 n. 49 (collecting sources).
' Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv. Civ. RTS.-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 91, 121 n.130 (2003) ("Statistical
significance in employment discrimination suits is often determined using a binomial distribution analysis,
which measures the probability that a certain outcome is due to chance."); Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a
Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 774 (2009) ("Under statistical
significance tests, a disparity is actionable when we can be confident at a specified level-generally ninety-
five percent-that the observed disparity is not due to random chance."); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-
Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 73, 137
n.237 (2010) ("The p-value is the chance or likelihood-'significance probability'-that the observed racial
disparity happened by chance (without regard to race)."); Michael 1. Meyerson & William Meyerson,
Significant Statistics: The Unwitting Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV.
771, 824 (2010) (stating that under a.05 significance level, one will incorrectly condemn the innocent only
five percent of the time); id. at 827 (stating that "[i]nnocent employers will lose only one time out of twenty
. . ."); David W. Barnes, The Significance of Quantitative Evidence in Federal Trade Commission
Deceptive Advertising Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 39 (1983) ("It is commonly accepted that
a significance level of 0.05, meaning that there is at most one chance in twenty that the difference is not
real but is just due to chance, is a small enough probability of error that scientists can conclude that the
differences are real."); Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are
Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 336 DEPAUL L. REv. 335, 348
n.49 (1999) ("Courts also require that the risk ratio in a study be 'statistically significant,' which is a
statistical measurement of the likelihood that any detected association has occurred by chance, or is due to
the exposure."). See also David L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil
Litigation: An Experimentfrom Patent Law, 26 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 458, 460 n. 187 (2013) ("Statistical
significance is the probability that an observed relationship is not due to chance."); Margaret 0. Farrell,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
2183, 2208-09 (1994) ("Statistical significance means that the likelihood that the test results . .. occurred
by chance are less than some amount, established by convention at 5%."); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1510-11 (1999) (stating that statistical
significance at the five percent level "mean s] that the probability that the investigation would have yielded
this result even if the hypothesis that it was trying to test was false is no greater than five percent").
" CUMMING, supra note 8, at 25-26.
PERNICIOUS P-VALUES
hope is there for students and teachers who wish to use it?"" One might
further ask, "If a technique is not even understood correctly by those for
whom it is a primary tool of their discipline, what hope is there forjudges and
juries for whom statistical techniques are, by and large, a foreign language?"
The ubiquity of the fallacy in the cases and its prevalence in the
literature should not mislead the reader into thinking that adequate cautions
are not widely available. There is ample commentary in the literature on this
specific problem. No one has been clearer in explaining the fallacy than
David Kaye:
The court's assumption, however, that when the "probability
of statistical error is less than 5%," the "scientific fact is at
least 95% certain" exemplifies a common misunderstanding
of the role of statistical tests in scientific inference. . . . The
difficulty is that this interpretation of the result of the
hypothesis test is wrong. The test was structured so as to
retain the null hypothesis unless the chance of getting the
evidence under this hypothesis fell below 5%. The test
focused exclusively on the probability of the evidence given
the null hypothesis. Nothing was said about the probability
of the hypothesis in the light of the experimental evidence. It
may be tempting to call the probability of 0.055 the chance
of a coincidence, and to say that the probability of something
other than a coincidence-of foul play- must be what is left
over, namely 0.945. But this only shows that one can "prove"
anything with words.59
Similarly, The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, provided free by the
Federal Judicial Center to all members of the federal judiciary (and available
without charge to all online), is also clear:
Because p is calculated by assuming that the null hypothesis
is correct, p does not give the chance that the null is true. The
p-value merely gives the chance of getting evidence against
the null hypothesis as strong as or stronger than the evidence
at hand. Chance affects the data, not the hypothesis.
According to the frequency theory of statistics, there is no
meaningful way to assign a numerical probability to the null
hypothesis. The correct interpretation of the p-value can
5' Id. at 26.
5 David H. Kaye, Statistical Signicance and the Burden ofPersuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
13, 21-2 (Autumn 1983); see also Robert Follett & Finis Welch, Testingfor Discrimination in Employment
Practices, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 174 (Autumn 1983) (stating that "the 0.05 rule does not say
that when a difference as large as two standard deviations occurs the probability that the two groups are
treated equally is 5% or less, nor does it say that the probability of unequal treatment is 95% or more.").
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therefore be summarized in two lines:
p is the probability of extreme data given the null
hypothesis.
p is not the probability of the null hypothesis
given extreme data.60
These clear explanations have not, unfortunately, been widely
internalized. One of the reasons for the persistence of the fallacy is that most
"statistical experts" who testify are not actually statisticians. Instead, they
come from fields such as psychology, sociology, or economics, and they use
statistics as tools of their discipline without necessarily understanding the
underlying principles.
D. Why it Matters
Why does this all matter? Isn't this just a debate about arcana of
interest only to statistics nerds? The answer is that it matters a lot, because
adoption of the fallacy causes courts to misunderstand what plaintiffs have
proven, and their misunderstanding is reinforced by the patina of precision
and objectivity seemingly conferred by mathematics."
1. The Transposition Fallacy Leads to an Unwarranted Sense of Certainty
When courts reason from a p-value of .05 that there is only a five-
percent chance that a disparity was caused by chance, they have effectively
ruled out chance as the cause and expect to see evidence from the employer
about what the systematic cause of the disparity was, often presuming
discrimination in the absence of such evidence. As Rex Kline has observed
with some understatement, "[a] researcher who mistakenly believes that low
p values make the null hypothesis unlikely may become overly confident in
the results."62 The same goes forjudges. For example, the Fourth Circuit has
stated that disparities of more than two or three standard deviations
6 KAYE & FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 250; see Bent, supra note 28, at 820-23.
6' A response to the above concern is that criticism of courts for committing the transposition fallacy
does not take into account that the defendant may still rebut the showing that chance has been ruled out.
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 134, 144 (7th ed., 2008) (arguing that the defendant may rebut the showing
with "[s]utficiently strong testimony . . . that it was chance that explained the disparity") [hereinafter
ZIMMER ET AL., 7th ed.]. There is much that is wrong about that argument. First, it does not take into
account what it is demanding of the employer: to demonstrate that chance was responsible in the face of
evidence that has already been erroneously interpreted to mean that there is a 95% probability that chance
was not responsible, a probability level that approaches the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Second,
this faulty evidence has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the employer to prove
nondiscrimination, which is inconsistent with the background rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving discrimination. See Texas Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). Third,
it is strange to argue that parties against whom faulty and misleading evidence is introduced should not
complain about its admission because they can always introduce evidence in rebuttal. Taken seriously, that
is an argument for repeal of all rules of evidence aimed at ensuring reliability.
62 KLINE, supra note 14, at 19.
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"conclusively ruled out chance as the cause of the disparity in the termination
rates."6 3  Many commentators also explicitly link the p-value with the
likelihood of making a mistake, as in the statement, "[w]hen led to a rejection
of the null hypothesis at a level of significance of 0.05, a court can be at least
95% confident that a disparity of treatment of the relevant groups exists."64
Instead, courts should reason that the statistics relied upon by the plaintiff
would be true of thousands of non-discriminating employers who were
selecting employees entirely at random.
It should be emphasized that not just five percent of employers are at
risk of being unfairly tarred through operation of the transposition fallacy.
Virtually all employers of any size, who have multiple departments, locations,
job categories, etc., are likely to have some-and perhaps many-statistically
significant disparities in their workforces due wholly to chance even if they
do not discriminate (and many others that are due to neither chance nor
discrimination).
Attempting to compute probabilities of random selection from p-
values is even more inappropriate in employment cases because, in many
cases, employers are subjected to litigation precisely because they have
statistical imbalances. In research, it is generally considered unethical to
simply look through a data set, find statistical relationships, and then report
them as if they support some particular hypothesis. That practice, "data
dredging" or "data mining," is acceptable as exploratory research that may
lead to further testing on a different population.6 5 Gerd Gigerenzer refers to
this phenomenon as Feynman's Conjecture, based upon the famous
physicist's reaction to a psychology researcher who, after running an
experiment in which rats ran in a T-maze and finding that they did not behave
as predicted, noted that the rats seemed to alternate right turns with left turns.6
The researcher wanted Feynman to calculate the probability of getting that
pattern (specifically to see if the probability was less than 5% and therefore
"statistically significant"). Feynman told him that he could not select the case
on the basis of the pattern revealed and then test it statistically. Instead, to
test the hypothesis that rats have a tendency to alternate in the maze, it would
be necessary to run the experiment on a different group of rats, not the group
that generated the hypothesis. The researcher did this and came up empty.
To understand how the selection of cases would tend to increase the
63 Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 336 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951
(1984).
6 Louis J. Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and its Application to Title VII Cases,
32 HASTINGS L.J. 59, 87 (1980).
63 To claim an effect based upon known statistical disparities is sometimes referred to as HARKing
(hypothesizing after the results are known). Norbert L. Kerr, HARKing: Hypothesizing After the Results
Are Known, 2 PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. REV. 196 (1998); see KLINE, supra note 14, at 73 (noting that
conducting many significance tests increases the likelihood of finding associations, even implausible ones).
6 GIGERENZER, supra note 14, at 602-03.
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number of false positives, imagine that 100 individuals flip a coin 100 times
each. Imagine also that the Department of Fair Coins is charged with
detection of unfair coins (coins having something other than a 50/50 chance
of flipping heads) and unfair coin flippers. Which flippers is the Department
going to scrutinize? It's not going to bother with the ones that got splits of
50/50, 49/51, 48/52, 47/53 etc. Rather, it will focus on the subset with the
more extreme numbers. Under the null hypothesis (that the coins were fair
and the flippers were honest), one would expect that about 5% of the 100
flippers would obtain a result as extreme as, or more extreme than, a 60/40 or
40/60 split. Yet, when the Department chooses to focus on the group with
imbalanced results and analyze their results statistically, a very high
percentage of the chosen cases would have statistically significant results
even if all of the coins were fair and all the flippers were honest. Similarly,
in the employment context, one would expect the EEOC or private plaintiffs
to concentrate their efforts against employers already known to have
relatively large disparities and then test them for statistical significance. A
large number of those selected employers would be expected to have
statistically significant disparities even if they hire randomly. Thus, just
"snooping" through data looking for significant differences-or selecting a
data set that has already been observed to have statistical associations-
ensures that the likelihood of Type I error is increased.6 7 This practice-using
the same data for selection and analysis-has been labeled "double dipping,"
and can "result in distorted descriptive statistics and invalid statistical
inference."' As Ronald Coase is reported to have said, "If you torture the
data long enough it will confess."69
2. The Transposition Fallacy Leads to Conflation of Significance Levels
and Standards of Proof: Scientific versus Legal Proof
The fact that the end product of hypothesis testing is a probability and
that the standard of proof is often also viewed as a probability"o has led some
courts and commentators to equate the two. After all, if social science
imposes a 95%-certainty requirement, significant results should engender a
61 Jonathan Taylor & Robert J. Tibshirani, Statistical Learning and Selective Inference, 112 PNAS
7629, 7629-30 (2015) (noting that when data have been "cherry picked"-that is, selected because of their
associations-then there must be a higher bar to declare the associations significant).
' Nikolaus Kriegeskorte et. al., Circular Analysis in Systems Neuroscience: The Dangers of Double
Dipping, 12 NATURENEUROSCI. 535, 535 (2009).
6 Gordon Tullock, A Comment on Daniel Klein's "A Plea to Economists Who Favor Liberty," 27 E.
ECON. J. 203, 205 (2001); see Harvey J. Motulsky, Common Misconceptions about Data Analysis and
Statistics, 35 J. PHARMACOL. & ExP. THER. 200, 200 (2014) ("Keep trying until you obtain a statistically
significant result or until you run out of money, time, or curiosity. The results from data collected this way
cannot be interpreted at face value.").
"o See Rita J. Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof A View from the Bench, the Jury,
and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 319, 325 (1971); C.M.A. McCauliff Burdens ofProof Degrees
of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293, 1293 (1982);
Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using Real Juries and
Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998).
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high degree of confidence in one's conclusions, far higher than the law
requires (at least outside of the criminal context)." In an early case involving
statistics, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit made explicit that confused
view:
Petitioners demand sole reliance on scientific facts, on
evidence that reputable scientific techniques certify as
certain. Typically, a scientist will not so certify evidence
unless the probability of error, by standard statistical
measurement, is less than 5%. That is, scientific fact is at
least 95% certain.
Such certainty has never characterized the judicial or the
administrative process. It may be that the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of criminal law demands 95%
certainty. But the standard of ordinary civil litigation, a
preponderance of the evidence, demands only 51% certainty.
A jury may weigh conflicting evidence and certify as
adjudicative (although not scientific) fact that which it
believes is more likely than not.72
A number of other courts," as well as commentators,7 4 have also made the
" See Farrell, supra note 56, at 2208-09 (questioning whether "the 95 percent certainty test" of
science should apply in legal proceedings).
72 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 n.58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (citation
omitted).
7 See In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation, 393 F. Supp. 2d 181, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
("Scientific convention defines statistical significance as 'p< .05,' i.e., no more than one chance in twenty
of finding a false association due to sampling error. Plaintiffs, however, need only prove that causation is
more-probable-than-not."); see also id. at 193 n.9 ("More-probable-than-not might be likened to p<.5, so
that preponderance of the evidence is nearly ten times less significant (whatever that might mean) than the
scientific standard."); Hodges v. Sec'y Dep't Health & Human Serv., 9 F.3d 958, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Newman, J., dissenting) ("Scientists as well as judges must understand 'the reality that the law requires a
burden of proof, or confidence level, other than the 95 percent confidence level that is often used by
scientists to reject the possibility that chance alone accounted for observed differences."'); id. at 965, 965
n.4 (quoting the Report of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Science
and Technology in Judicial Decision Making 28 (1993) (stating that "although the data may not establish
a causal relationship to a medical certainty, they may nonetheless meet the more-likely-than-not standard
of the law," and noting that "reasonable medical certainty" for statistical data "means that the results are
statistically significant at the confidence level normally required for scientific acceptance and publication
in a scientific journal-usually about 0.95."); Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharma., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1117,
1120 (D. Idaho 1990) ("[T]he plaintiff need only prove that it is more probably true than not that the
mother's ingestion of Bendectin caused David's Poland's Syndrome. This certainly does not require a
confidence level of 95%, 90% or even 80%. A cause-and-effect relationship may be deemed insignificant
under stringent scientific standards, but nevertheless establish causation under legal standards.").
7 Steven R. Weller, Book Review: Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy ofScience and Law, 6
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 435, 436, 437-38 (1993) ("[O]nly when the statistical evidence gathered from studies
shows that it is more than ninety-five percent likely that a test substance causes cancer will the substance
be characterized scientifically as carcinogenic. . . . [Tio determine legal causality, the plaintiff need only
establish that the probability with which it is true that the substance in question causes cancer is at least
[sic] fifty percent, rather than the ninety-five percent to prove scientific causality. . . ."); Braun, supra note
64, at 70 (stating that "the plaintiff must establish that there is at least a 95% chance that the defendant's
actions were discriminatory before the court will hold that a prima facie case has been established by a
preponderance of the evidence").
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fundamental error of equating the p-value with the probability of false
inculpation.
Once it is recognized that the p-value does not reflect the probability
of making a mistake, there is no basis for viewing the preponderance of
evidence and a p-value of .05 as two points on the same scale with the latter
indicating a higher degree of certainty. Moreover, as discussed below, the
"certainty" purportedly required by social science standards is anything but.
The contrast between "scientific standards" (which are thought to
require near certainty) and "legal standards" (which are viewed as much more
forgiving) is based upon an incorrect view of what a scientist has proved with
a finding of statistical significance. A finding that results are statistically
significant at the .05 level does not establish that a phenomenon exists or even
that there is a 95-percent chance that it does." As David Colquhon has noted,
"Observation of a P value close to 0.05 means nothing more than 'worth
another look."'76 He notes that "[i]f you want to avoid making a fool of
yourself too often, don't regard anything bigger than P <0.001 as a
demonstration that you've discovered something." Ronald A. Fisher, who
developed the concept of p-values, cautioned regarding the .05 significance
level that "[a] scientific fact should be regarded as experimentally established
only if a properly designed experiment rarely fails to give this level of
significance."" Only when an experiment is repeatedly replicated can it be
viewed as an established phenomenon (still subject to later revision or even
rejection).
It is thus a mistake to draw strong conclusions from a single
hypothesis test. Perhaps ironically in light of the present discussion, Steven
Goodman criticizes the use of hypothesis testing in medical research precisely
because it fails to operate as a proper justice system would:
Hypothesis tests are equivalent to a system of justice that is
not concerned with which individual defendant is found
guilty or innocent (that is, "whether each separate hypothesis
is true or false") but tries instead to control the overall
number of incorrect verdicts (that is, "in the long run of
experience, we shall not often be wrong"). Controlling
mistakes in the long run is a laudable goal, but just as our
sense ofjustice demands that individual persons be correctly
judged, scientific intuition says that we should try to draw the
" See Donald Berry, Multiplicities in Cancer Research: Ubiquitous and Necessary Evils, 104 J. NATL.
CANCER INST. 1124, 1125 (stating that "[miuch of the world acts as though statistical significance implies
truth, which is not even approximately correct").
" David Colquhoun, An Investigation of the False Discovery Rate and the Misinterpretation of P
Values, 1 R. Soc. OPEN SC. 1, 11 (2014).
" Ronald A. Fisher, The Arrangement ofField Experiments, 33 J. MIN. AGRIC. G. BR. 503, 504 (1926).
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proper conclusions from individual studies.78
As should be obvious, it is the contention here that what Goodman
describes is exactly the situation that now exists in the legal system.
It is by now widely recognized that what passes for "findings" in
science are not "established" in the way they are often thought to be. In a
provocative essay titled Why Most Published Research Findings Are False,
John loannidis noted the increasing concern in modern research that "false
findings may be the majority or even the vast majority of published research
claims." 79 One reason is the claiming of conclusive research findings on "the
basis of a single study assessed by formal statistical significance, typically for
ap-value of less than 0.05"so-in other words, just the kind of study that often
forms the centerpiece of an employment discrimination plaintiffs case
(although typically with substantially more attention to potentially
moderating variables than exhibited in the typical discrimination case). David
Colquhoun estimates that 30% is the minimum bound of the proportion of
experiments wrongly claiming to have an effect and that loannidis's assertion -
that a majority of published research findings is false "seems to be not unduly
alarmist."" One reason is that it is relatively easy to finesse an analysis to
convert not-quite-significant results into statistical significance. 82
Far from establishing anything to any degree of certainty, statistically
significant results in the social-science literature are increasingly recognized
as being of questionable merit. As one statistician has noted, "The ease with
which a researcher can report statistically significant evidence for untrue
hypotheses fills the literature with false positives."8  Recent attempts to'
replicate results of published studies-even well-regarded ones-have often
failed.' An attempt at replication of 100 studies published in three leading
8 Goodman, supra note 24, at 998.
7 John P.A. loannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 696, 696
(2005).
' Id.; see also Regina Nuzzo, Statistical Errors: P Values, the 'Gold Standard' ofStatistical Validity,
Are Not as Reliable as Many Scientists Assume, 506 NATURE 150, 150 (2014) (referring to "the surprisingly
slippery nature of the P value, which is neither as reliable nor as objective as most scientists assume");
Lewis G. Halsey et. al., The Fickle P Value Generates Irreproducible Results, 12 NATURE METHODS 179,
179 (2015).
8 Colquhoun, supra note 76, at 13.
82 See E. J. Masicampo & Daniel R. Lalande, A Peculiar Prevalence of P Values Just Below .05, Q. J.
EXP. PSYCHOL. 2271, 2272 (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2012.711335; Joseph P. Simmons
et. al., False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows
Presenting Anything as Significant, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1359, 1359 (2011),
http://joumals.sagepub.com/doilpdf10.l 177/0956797611417632; Leslie K. John et. a]., Measuring the
Prevalence of Questionable Research Practices With Incentives for Truth Telling, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 524,
524 (2012), http://joumals.sagepub.com/doilpdf/10.1177/0956797611430953.
83 KLINE, supra note 14, at 106; see also Simmons et. a]., supra note 82, at 1359 (noting that "it is
unacceptably easy to publish 'statistically significant' evidence consistent with any hypothesis").
* Harold Pashler & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Editors' Introduction to the Special Section on
Replicability in Psychological Science: A Crisis of Confidence?, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCi. 528, 528
(2012) (describing current concern over reliability of research findings in psychology),
http://www.ejwagenmakers.com/2012/PashlerWagenmakers2012.pdf
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psychology journals found that only a minority could be replicated with
statistically significant results."
Given the relatively low standards applied to social science findings
of statistically significant differences, it is disappointing to see the eagerness
of courts to accept evidence that would not even be sufficient to a social
scientist. The Supreme Court in Bazemore v. Friday encouraged such
reasoning when it observed, in rejecting a defense argument about the
weakness of the plaintiffs' statistical showing, that a "[a] plaintiff in a Title
VII suit need not prove discrimination with scientific certainty; rather, his or
her burden is to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence."86
Although literally true-though nothing in science is "certain" and amenable
to "proof' the way a mathematical theorem is-the Court's statement seemed
to be animated by an overly sanguine view of the certainty provided by
scientific studies. The Tenth Circuit has expressed a similar view: "while
social scientists search for certainty, the trier of fact in a Title VII case need
only find that discrimination is more likely than not."87 It also noted that
"statistics that are insignificant to the social scientist may well be relevant to
a court."" The underlying theme of these comments is that statistically
significant findings in the sciences and social sciences are in some sense
"scientifically proved" or "scientifically certain" and that the law requires
something less.89
Judge Posner has also contrasted science versus law in responding to
a disparity that was not significant at the .05 level. In Kadas v. MCI
Systemhouse Corp.,o he stated:
The 5 percent test is arbitrary; it is influenced by the fact that
scholarly publishers have limited space and don't want to
clog up their journals and books with statistical findings that
have a substantial probability of being a product of chance
rather than of some interesting underlying relation between
the variables of concern. Litigation generally is not fussy
about evidence; much eyewitness and other nonquantitative
evidence is subject to significant possibility of error, yet no
85 OPEN SCI. COLLABORATION, Estimating the Reproducibility ofPsychological Science, 349 SCIENCE
943,943 (2015).
478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986).
Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 1988).
88 Id.
89 See also EEOC v. American Nat'1 Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1192 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that "authority
can be found for the proposition that most social scientists, applying laboratory rigor to rule out chance as
even a theoretical possibility rather than the law's rougher gauge of the 'preponderance of the evidence,'
are prepared to discard chance as an hypothesis when its probability level is no more than 5%, i.e. at
approximately two standard deviations"); Marcel C. Garaud, Legal Standards andStatistical Proofin Title
VII Litigation: In Search of a Coherent Disparate Impact Model, U. PENN. L. REv. 455, 456 (1990)
(complaining that disparate-impact plaintiffs have "had to present statistical analyses that satisfy a strict
scientific standard that is inconsistent with the traditional legal standards of proof').
9 255 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2001).
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effort is made to exclude it if it doesn't satisfy some
counterpart to the 5 percent significance test.91
In fact, however, concerns about reliability of statistical evidence
should lead to exclusion if the statistical study does not satisfy the dictates of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, just as with other scientific or technical
evidence. Rule 702 actually requires judges to be "fussy" about evidence.
As the Supreme Court stated in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,92 the purpose
of the judge's gatekeeping role "is to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs
in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field."9 3 If a disparity that does not
provide a p-value of less than .05 would not be accepted as meaningful in the
expert's discipline, it is not clear that the expert should be allowed to testify-
-on the basis of his expertise in that discipline-that the disparity is, in fact,
meaningful.94
Although one might question why scientific evidence should have to
meet a higher standard than other evidence, the heightened reliability standard
for expert testimony established by the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.95 and revised Rule 702 is justified on
the ground that "expert testimony is ... uniquely vulnerable to 'adversarial
bias"-that is, the fact that reports are produced by experts retained by the
opposing parties who have financial incentives to tailor their testimony in a
particular direction. Adversarial bias is a particular risk with statistical
analyses, given the flexibility that analysts have in interpreting the results of
studies that they themselves have run, as opposed to reporting on studies
performed and interpreted by others.97 There is a broader kind of bias, though,
and that is in the research literature itself. As John loannidis has noted, bias
may not have financial roots, but rather "[s]cientists in a given field may be
prejudiced purely because of their belief in a scientific theory or commitment
" Id at 362. Elsewhere, Judge Posner was more explicit on this point, arguing that "excluding
statistical evidence that failed to reach the five percent significance level would imply that eyewitness
testimony, too, should be inadmissible unless the probability that the testimony would have been given
even if the event testified to had not occurred was less than five percent"). Posner, supra note 56, at 1511.
The practiced eye will now see that Judge Posner was engaging in the transposition fallacy.
9 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
9 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendments (embodying the
direction of the Kumho Court's holding in regards to expert testimony).
" See David L. Faigman et. al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony,
81 U. CHI. L. REv. 417, 464 (2014) (noting that expert's "[alssertion that 'the journal publication context'
requires 'a higher standard of proof than the courtroom starkly indicates a failure to apply in the courtroom
'the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field'")
(quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152).
95 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
' Id; see David E. Bemstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the
Daubert Revolution, 93 lOWA L. REv. 451 (2008).
9 See generally Simmons et. al., supra note 82, at 1359, http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/
article?id=10.1371/joumal.pmed.0020124.
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to their own findings."9 8 This kind of bias is very likely to color the kinds of
research findings about discrimination that are published.99 It is probably fair
to say that most social scientists who study discrimination are invested in
there being a lot of it for reasons both ideological (it suits their world-view)ico
and pragmatic (findings of no or low levels of discrimination are far less sexy,
and thus less publishable, than findings of rampant discrimination, a fact that
creates pressure on researchers to resort to increasingly broad definitions of
discrimination in order to obtain "significant" results)."0 ' As David Hull has
observed, "One of the strengths of science is that it does not require that
scientists are unbiased, only that different scientists have different biases."'0 2
Unfortunately, in many of the social sciences, most scientists have the same
bias. 03
Statistical studies introduced at trial by experts in their fields often fall
far short of the standards of publishable work even in the social sciences. For
example, in Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt University,'" the plaintiff's expert, a
well-known sociologist, submitted a report concluding that her regression
analysis demonstrated sex discrimination in setting salaries of university faculty.
Yet, according to the District Court, she omitted from her analysis "most of the
measures of professional achievement-such as research productivity, speaking
engagements, participation in professional organizations and other service to the
9 loannidis, supra note 79, at 698.
" In her article, Deborah Weiss discusses the work of William Bielby, whom she describes as "both
a leading scholar on discrimination and a leading expert for plaintiffs." Whether one thinks that ideological
bias or financial bias is a greater risk to the integrity of analyses, Bielby embodies both. He has probably
earned hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars testifying for plaintiffs in discrimination cases,
and he relies to a large extent on his work that is published in scholarly journals. If his scholarly work took
a turn less favorable to plaintiffs, one might imagine that this abundant source of cash would dry up. Weiss,
supra note 28, at 1684.
" Jos6 Duarte et. al., Political Diversity Will Improve Social Psychological Science, 38 BEHAV. &
BRAIN Sci. 1, 1 (2015) (describing the lack of political diversity in social psychology and its impact not
only on the interpretation of results but also on the nature of the questions that are asked).
'0 Cf Green, supra note 56, at 92 ("[R]egulation of some of the more complex, subtle forms of
discrimination common in today's workplace requires a focus on the operation of discriminatory bias as
influenced, enabled, and even encouraged by the structures, practices, and dynamics of the organizations
and groups within which individuals work. In other words, it posits the need to conceptualize
discrimination in terms of workplace dynamics rather than solely in existing terms of an identifiable actor's
isolated state of mind, a victim's perception of his or her work environment, or the job-relatedness of a
neutral employment practice with adverse consequences." (footnote omitted)); see also Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, I HARv. L. & PUB. POL. REV. 470, 478
(2007) (arguing that "responding to implicit bias requires moving 'beyond the generally accepted
normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination law') (citation omitted); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane,
Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 465 (2010).
102 DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 22 (2010).
103 See generally Duarte et al., supra note 100. An interesting phenomenon in the scholarly literature
is that the "harder" the science, the more likely researchers are to report negative results, or conversely,
that the "softer" the discipline the more likely researchers are to report positive results. Daniele Fanelli,
'Positive' Results Increase Down the Hierarchy of the Sciences, 5 PLOS ONE 5(4), 2 (2010). This result
might seem counter-intuitive, since researchers in harder sciences might be expected to formulate more
theoretically rigorous hypotheses. Yet, researchers in softer fields have more freedom to interpret their
results, thereby giving them the opportunity to "find" in the data results they believe true.
1" 1 F. Supp. 2d 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
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field, and success in obtaining grants-which contribute to disparities in
salary."' 05 Moreover, most of the disparities that the expert identified were not
statistically significant, which was the basis for the District Court's discounting
of her analysis." One assumes (or at least hopes) that sociology journals would
demand more from a scholar who was purporting to demonstrate the existence of
discrimination.'o7
One difference between what courts do and what professional
standards in the social sciences require is how they respond to statistical
analyses that do not really prove much. Although social-science journals do
not reject every article that lacks a compelling statistical analysis, they will
reject them when the data upon which the analysis is based are so incomplete
that no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from them. In contrast, courts
often take the attitude that if the only data are incomplete (especially if it is
through no fault of the plaintiff), it would be unfair not to let the plaintiff rely
on even bad data, leaving it to juries to sort out the inadequacies of the studies,
as if they were capable of doing so.'o If a social scientist submitted a study
to a journal with a small sample showing no statistically significant results,
for example, it would probably be returned to the investigator, along with
suggestions that the sample size needed to be increased in order to provide
meaningful results. In contrast, courts often forgive non-significant results in
plaintiff's regressions on the ground that the sample is so small,'" when they
'5 Id at 805; see also Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 528 (9th Cir. 2002) (Klinefeld, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[a] regression of salaries in a university setting that
doesn't include doctorate, merit, or performance as variables is like a regression study that predicts shoe
size from weight without considering foot size").
'" Despite the court's acknowledgment of the study's inadequacies, it suggested that its conclusions
about the study would have been "entirely different" had the disparities been statistically significant, as if
statistical significance could make up for the failure of a model to reflect reality. Dobbs-Weinstein, 1 F.
Supp. 2d at 807 n.34.
'07 See also Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 637 F. 3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2011) (plaintiffs expert testified
that employer's compensation system was discriminatory without controlling for differences in jobs
performed by male and female employees in each compensation category; when those were controlled, the
sex disparity disappeared).
"os See, e.g., Malave v. Potter, 320 F.3d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 2003) (where plaintiffs in a promotion case
did not have data on the applicant pool or the eligible labor pool, Court of Appeals overturned summary
judgment for defendant on the ground that comparisons to the ethnic composition of the overall Postal
Service workforce in Connecticut were good enough); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d
451, 458 (S.D.N.Y., 2004) (rejecting defendant's argument that the EEOC's expert's report should be
excluded for failure to include variables such as the employee's ability to interact productively with other
employees; assistance provided to co-workers; work ethic; participation in firm recruiting, mentoring and
training; and competitive market dynamics. The court reasoned that because no data existed on these
variables that the employer contended were important in promotion and compensation, a regression that
did not consider them should be permitted to go to the jury, leaving the jury to decide which variables
should be included).
" See, e.g., Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 153 (2nd Cir. 2012) (accepting a study
with a p-value of.13, stating that "requiring a statistical showing of 95-percent confidence would make it
mathematically impossible to rely upon statistics in a case like this one, in which the relevant population
included so few Asian Americans"); Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1379 (2d Cir.1991) (noting
that "the lack of statistical significance in the ultimate promotion reflects only the small sample size.").
See also Transcript of Videotaped Deposition of Michael A. Campion, Ph.D., at 184, Karlo V. Pittsburgh
Glass Works, LLC, Case 2:10-cv-01283-TFM Document 317-4, W.D. Pa., Aug. 2, 2013, 2014 WL
12539666 (testifying that results are significant at the thirteen percent level).
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should recognize that some questions-especially when sample size is small-
-simply are not amenable to statistical analysis. The problem with courts' not
fulfilling their gatekeeping function and allowingjuries to decide on their own
is that, as Judge Jack Weinstein has stated, "An expert can be found to testify
to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous . . . .""0
Judges who fail in their gatekeeping responsibility then simply throw up their
hands and call it a "jury question."
Judge Posner's relaxed attitude toward issues of statistical
significance in Kadas was recently taken to an absurd extreme by the District
Court in In re Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litigation. Judge Posner had said
in Kadas, after noting that the five-percent significance level was arbitrary-
which it surely is-that "[i]t is for thejudge to say, on the basis of the evidence
of a trained statistician, whether a particular significance level .. . is too low
to make the study worth the consideration of judge or jury.""' In the
Photochromic Lens case, the magistrate judge had excluded an expert's
studies because he had used a p-value of .50 - yes, .50! The district court
rejected the magistrate's conclusion, accepting the expert's testimony that he
had used a significance level of .50 for two reasons: 1) because the data set
was so limited that using a more conventional significance level would mean
that the study would lack the "power to detect impact"; and 2) because he
wanted to avoid false negatives, i.e., Type II errors." 2 It should first be noted
that these are not two different reasons, but rather two ways of stating the
same reason because power is the likelihood of not making a Type II error." 3
Moreover, given that it is axiomatic that there is a tradeoff between false
positives (Type I errors) and false negatives (Type II errors) (although the
extent of the tradeoff is generally impossible to quantify), a desire to avoid
Type II errors would always counsel in favor of a more permissive
significance level.
No competent social scientist would use a significance level of .50
(or anything close to it, for that matter) because the null hypothesis would be
rejected in too many cases in which it is true-with a significance level of
.50, in almost half of all such cases." 4 To return to the coin-flip analogy,
imagine that you wanted to test whether a coin was fair. You flip the coin
"0 Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 482 (1986); see also
KLNE, supra note 14, at 100 (observing that "[t]he sad truth is that there is no claim so preposterous that
a PhD scientist cannot be found to vouch for it") (quoting Robert L. Park, The Seven Warning Signs of
Voodoo Science, I THINK 33, 33 (2003)).
"' Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 363 (7th Cir. 2001).
112 In re Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litigation, (M.D. Florida April 3, 2014) WL 1338605; 2014-1,
Trade Cases P 78, 732.
"' Jacob Cohen, A Power Primer, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 155, 156 (1992). The probability ofmaking a
Type II error-that is, the probability of failing to reject a false null hypothesis-is denominated /. Power is
defined as 1 -,8. See id.
" But see Richard Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1098, 1099 (1985) (asserting that "[slurely statistical evidence that is significant at the .10 level or even
the .50 level often meets" the relevance test of Rule 401).
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100 times. In order to reject the null hypothesis using a significance level of
.05, you must get a result more extreme than a 60-40 split. In order to reject
the null hypothesis at a .50 level, you need only a result that is more extreme
than a 53-47 split.' No one who knows the slightest amount of statistics
would actually believe that one should label as "statistically significant" a
disparity that would be expected by chance about half the time, although
perhaps such a person would be willing to so testify if the price is right."' It
is true, as the experts claimed, that the risk of false exculpations is greatly
reduced by setting the significance level so high-but the probability of any
exculpation at all, even a correct one, is also dramatically reduced.
The comparison between scientific and legal proof is based on both
an overestimation of the certainty of what statistically significant results mean
in science and the meaningfulness of statistical analyses in legal cases. The
notion that the law should be more lax than the relatively lax standards of
social science leads to admission into evidence of statistical analyses that do
not mean very much. A social science study that reports a spurious finding
wastes a few pages in a journal that were likely to be wasted anyway. Yet,
millions of dollars often turn on whether a particular statistical study is
accepted as establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.' The Ninth
Circuit (oddly enough) had it right in Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher
Education,"8 stating:
We note in passing that it is often acceptable in the social
sciences to use a statistical model for proof of behavior even
where, in an absolute sense, that model does not describe the
data well. However, courts are not free to decide legal
propositions on hypothetical evidence. This is especially true
11 This is using a two-tailed test Using a one-tailed test, the results are even starker. Using a one-tailed test,
you are testing for disparity in only one direction. So, assume that you are testing whether the coin is biased toward
heads. Because you want a really good test, you give it a million trials (you have a lot of time and a really strong
thumb). You toss 500,001 heads out of 1,000,000 trials, a result far closer to the expected 500,000 than one could
ever realistically hope to obtain in the real world. Yet, the disparity between observed and expected would be
"statistically significant" at the .50 level---that is, the result would be obtained by chance less than 50 percent of
the time assuming that the null hypothesis (that the coin was fair) is true.
"6 One might have thought that there was only one expert in the world willing to testify that ap-value of.50
was appropriate. One would have been wrong. In In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, WL 1351040
(N.D. Cal. 2014), the plaintiffs' expert sought to testify that results of his statistical model were statistically
significant at the .50 level and that such a significance level was an appropriate balance of the risk of Type I and
Type 11 errors. The court did not address the merits of the expert's opinion, however, instead excluding it on the
ground that the assertion was not raised until a reply brief and was therefore untimely. Id at 7. The court still
managed to commit the transposition fallacy along the way, however. See id at 6-7 ("If the p-value is less than
or equal to the selected significance level, the null can be rejected because the result is said to be 'statistically
significant' at that level, which means the probability that the observed association is the result of chance rather
than a true association is less than the stated significance level.").
.." Either because it leads to an adverse judgment on the merits against the employer or forces
settlement Given the extremely high cost of defending class actions, class certification usually leads to
settlement, often resulting in recovery for plaintiffs even in cases they would be unlikely to win at trial.
See Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J. L. & FEM. 119, 134 n.56
and accompanying text (2012).
118 816 F.2d 458, 468 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987).
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where courts are asked to draw inferences as to the existence
of hidden discriminatory motives from statistical evidence.
Unlike in law, in science, "behavioural decisions are rarely made on
the basis of a single significance test."" 9 As Jason Chin has noted, though
the scientific stakes of allowing bodies of research to rest on unreliable
findings are high, they are just as high in law (one might argue, even higher),
where there is less opportunity for self-correction than there is in science.' 2 0
E. Would a Better Explanation of the Meaning of the P-Value Solve the
Problem?
If the meaning of the p-value that judges and jury seemingly
universally rely on is incorrect, one solution might be to make sure that they
are correctly educated about its meaning, untainted by the transposition
fallacy. It is, after all, the transposition fallacy that causes the false equating
of significance levels and standards of proof. It might be argued that except
for correcting that small flaw, cases otherwise could proceed much the same
as they would today.
There are two problems with such an approach. The first is that it is
very difficult to prevent people from engaging in the transposition fallacy, so
it is questionable whether in the short space of a trial the jury could be
educated out of it. The second is that, once the transposition fallacy is out of
bounds, the probative value of p-values is quite slim. That is, they simply
don't tell you very much.
1. The Transposition Fallacy Seems Intractable
Experience has shown that the hope that jurors can be instructed in such
a way as to avoid the transposition fallacy is unrealistic. After all, judges
routinely engage in the transposition fallacy despite the fact that it is amply
described in the legal literature. The Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence, provided to all federal judges, could not be clearer. "p is
not the probability of the null hypothesis given extreme data." 2 ' One
employment discrimination casebook in its Seventh Editionl 22 noted an earlier
article of mine that described the transposition fallacy and observed that I was
"theoretically correct," but nonetheless went on to describe the meaning of thep-
value in terms embodying the transposition fallacy.1 23 In the Eighth Edition of
.. Peter Dixon, The P-Value Fallacy and How to Avoid It, 57 CANAD. J. EXPER PSYCHOL. 189, 190
(2003).
" Jason M. Chin, Psychological Science's Replicability Crisis and What it Means for Science in the
Courtroom, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL., & LAW, 225, 225 (2014).
121 KAYE & FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at250.
122 ZIMMER ET AL., 7th ed., supra note 61, at 143-144.
123 Id. at 143 ("Setting the level of significance at 0.05 means that a Type I error is made in only 5
percent of the cases, that is, 5 in 100 times").
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the same book, the acknowledgment that I was correct was removed, the
transposition fallacy was described in even more cursory fashion, and the
meaning of the significance level was described in the same fallacious terms as
in the prior edition.' 24 It thus appears that even a glimmer of understanding of
the issue is easily extinguished in the absence of constant vigilance.
The fallacy persists even in the social sciences among people who
clearly should know better. Psychologists Ruma Falk and Charles
Greenbaum have suggested why the misconception persists: "When a
procedure instructs us to reject a hypothesis, in the context of scientific
induction, believing that the hypothesis deserves to be rejected, namely that
it is no longer credible, is inevitable."'2 5 They continue:
Altogether, misinterpreting a significant result as conveying
the probability of the null hypothesis is prevalent and robust
in the face of variations in problem presentation and in
subjects' level of sophistication. It appears that the illusion is
hard to eradicate. It keeps creeping into texts of authors who
surely know better, and it is devious in evading critical
reviewing. We confess to believing so ourselves for years,
and probably passing it over to many of our students, until
we came to realize our mistake. Serious intrinsic factors must
work to keep the misconception alive.' 26
These comments, it should be noted, refer to the persistence of the
transposition fallacy among professionals who perform statistical analyses for
a living. If the clear and thorough explanation ofp-values in the literature has
not penetrated the minds of highly educated judges and many social scientists,
124 In the Seventh Edition, there was a description of how the transposition fallacy could result in a
number of false positives in discrimination cases far in excess of the five percent that the typical
interpretation of the p-value would suggest. Id. at 144. In the Eighth Edition, the only illustration of how
the fallacy operates is with respect to a medical test for a rare disease. ZIMMER ET AL., 8th ed., supra note
15, at 135. In the Seventh Edition, the book accurately described the problem (although not calling it the
transposition fallacy) as "confus[ing] the probability of a particular result given the null hypothesis with
the probability of the null hypothesis given the observed result." ZIMMER ET AL., 7th ed., supra note 61, at
144. That explanation was removed from the Eighth Edition, which continues to aggressively promote the
transposition fallacy. ZIMMER ET AL., 8th ed., supra note 15, at 127 ("Be clear what this means: ifa certain
result is 'statistically significant,' it is unlikely to be the result of chance."); id at 134 ("The statistician's
job is to determine the probability that chance explains the difference"); id ("[A] statistician can inform
the court how probable it is that a certain pattern of selections would have occurred if color were not
somehow influencing the selection decision."); id. at 135 ("Setting the level of significance at 0.05 means
that a Type I error is made in only 5 percent of the cases, that is, 5 in 100 times."); id. at 137 ("The outcome
is not likely to be the result of chance when a result is more than 2 standard deviations from the norm; in
such a case, there are only 4 chances in 100 that the result is consistent with the null hypothesis, that the
differences are the result of chance."); id. at 138 ("Rejecting the null hypothesis means that it is much more
likely than not (though not certain) that the null hypothesis is incorrect.").
.2s Ruma Falk & Charles W. Greenbaum, Significance Tests Die Hard: The Amazing Persistence ofa
Probabilistic Misconception, 5 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 75, 81 (1995).
"' Id at 86; see Sellke et al., supra note 8, at 62 (noting that "[ajlthough standard textbooks typically
warn against such interpretations, the warnings often go unheeded"); id at 71 (noting that "[tihe standard
approach in teaching-of stressing the formal definition of a p value while warning against its
misinterpretation-has simply been an abysmal failure").
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the idea that a jury is going to achieve enlightenment on the point during the
course of a trial seems purely fanciful. 27
The persistence of erroneous beliefs aboutp-values was illustrated in
a study of the effectiveness of teaching interventions designed to counteract
their misunderstanding.1 28 The researchers identified two possible reasons for
the seeming intractability of the transposition fallacy. The first is simply a
lack of understanding of Bayesian posterior probabilities, which leads people
to confound the prior probability, which is given by the p-value, with the
posterior probability. The second is that it is based on a misapplication of the
Modus Tollens argument in a probabilistic context. The Modus Tollens
argument has the structure:
If A, then not B,
B
Therefore, not A.
In the context of hypothesis testing, a matching argument would be:
If the Null Hypothesis is true, the Data would not
occur.
The Data have occurred
Therefore, the Null Hypothesis is not true.
But in actual hypothesis testing, the premises are not categorical but
probabilistic:
If the Null Hypothesis is true, the Data are unlikely
to occur
The Data have occurred
Therefore the Null Hypothesis is probably not true.
What is a valid argument in the categorical case is not necessarily a valid
argument in the probabilistic case, as the researchers point out by relying on
the following example:
If a person is an American, then he is probably not a
127 Gerd Gigerenzer asks:
Why do intelligent people engage in statistical rituals rather than in statistical
thinking? Every person of average intelligence can understand that p(D H) is not the
same as p(HID). That this insight fades away when it comes to hypothesis testing
suggests that the cause is not intellectual but social and emotional.
Gigerenzer, supra note 14, at 599. He finds the answer to the question in unconscious conflicts among
statistics researchers. But judges and lawyers are not party to those conflicts, and they also seem unable to
avoid the trap.
128 Pawel Kalinowski, Fiona Fidler & Geoff Cumming, Overcoming the Inverse Probability Fallacy:
A Comparison of Two Teaching Interventions, 4 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 152, 152 (2008).
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member of Congress
This person is a member of Congress.
Therefore, he is probably not an American.
Given the two potential sources of the transposition fallacy, the
researchers designed two interventions to attempt to counter them. Students
were exposed to one of two 45-minute tutorials, one explicitly contrasting
Bayesian analysis with NHST p-values and the other explaining why Modus
Tollens reasoning does not apply to probabilistic premises. Subjects were
undergraduate students who had completed four courses in statistics and were
familiar with p-values and NHST. Prior to the intervention, the students were
given a survey in which they were asked whether they agreed or disagreed
with six typical misinterpretations of p-values, and they were then given the
survey immediately after the tutorial and then again five weeks later (wording
of the questions was altered to attempt to mitigate practice effects).
The interventions did have some effect. Prior to the intervention, the
average number of misconceptions aboutp-values was 4.0 per student (out of
the maximum of 6), with 97% incorrectly agreeing with at least 1.
Immediately after the intervention, the average went down to 2.0
misconceptions, but it went up to 2.7 per student at the five-week follow-up.
The researchers concluded that the interventions "were remarkably effective
in reducing the misconceptions of NHST p values," and it is clear that the
post-intervention performance was better than that prior to the intervention. 129
The glass-half-empty story in the study is that the intervention only
reduced the students' misconceptions by half immediately after the
intervention and only by a third measured five weeks later, at a time when the
average student endorsed almost half (45%) of the tendered
misconceptions.' 30 Thus, students experienced in statistics who were
specifically schooled on the transposition fallacy nonetheless continued to fall
into its trap leading to serious doubt that the deep innumeracy of judges and
juries could be overcome during the course of a trial.
2. The P-Value Does not Tell You Much
Even if the transposition fallacy could be avoided, it is not clear what
would be gained by conveying a correct understanding of p-values to juries.
Informing the trier of fact that the p-value is not the probability that an
employer obtained its workforce through random selection, but rather the
probability that an employer selecting randomly, would have that
representation assuming that the null hypothesis is true does not provide the
129 Id. at 157.
130 See also KLINE, supra note 14, at 104 (noting that "the clich6 of'better teaching' about significance
testing has not in more than 60 years improved the situation").
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trier of fact with information that is useful. Apart from that definition,
however, it is much easier to say what the p-value is not than what it is.
The p-value is of only modest relevance to someone trained not to
engage in the transposition fallacy (though, as has been shown, it is of great
relevance to someone who commits the fallacy). As a general matter, it can
be said that small p-values are in general less consistent with the null
hypothesis than large p-values. As Geoff Cumming has observed:
Other things being equal, the smaller the p, the more reason
we have to doubt the null. In a later chapter I'll demonstrate
that p is actually an extremely poor and vague measure of
evidence against the null. Even though, thinking of p as
strength of evidence may be the least bad approach.' 3 '
Now, that approach may lead one to think, for example, that if one
employer's workforce has a disparity yielding a p-value of .05 and another
has a disparity with a workforce yielding a disparity of.01, the null hypothesis
is less likely to be true in the latter case than in the former. But that is not
correct, since all else is unlikely to be equal.' 32 Thus, "the P value ... does
not reliably indicate the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis."'33
Now, it certainly true as a general matter that-given a particular
employer-a disparity with ap-value of .001 suggests that the null hypothesis is
less likely to be true than if the disparity had ap-value of .05 (although how much
less likely it is cannot be calculated by comparing the two p-values). But here,
you don't need the lowerp-value to tell you that the null hypothesis is less likely;
you have the more extreme disparity that led to the greaterp-value to tell you that.
Thep-value adds virtually nothing and just muddies the water.
3. P-Values Should Be Excluded under FRE 403
The ease with which reported p-values cause a trier of fact to slip into
the transposition fallacy and the difficulty of avoiding that lapse of logic,
coupled with the relatively sparse information actually provided by the p-
value, make p-values prime candidates for exclusion under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403. That rule allows for exclusion of evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of.. . confusing the issues, [or]
misleading the jury . . . ."134 If judges, not to mention the statistical experts
"' CUMMING, supra note 8, at 33.
132 See Steven Goodman, A Dirty Dozen: Twelve P-Value Misconceptions, 45 SEMINARS IN HEMATOLOGY
135, 137 (2008) (noting that "[d]ramatically different observed effects can have the same P value").
..3 Halsey et al., supra note 80, at 179. In order for the p-value to give a reliable indication of the
strength of evidence against the null hypothesis, the statistical power of the study must be very high.
Statistical power is the capacity of the experiment to find an effect when there actually is an effect. The
power of a study cannot be measured directly, but it depends on a variety of study features, including the
significance level, the size of the expected effect, population variability, the nature of the alternative
hypothesis, the nature of the test, and sample size. Id. at 181.
"3 FED. R. EVID. 403.
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they rely on, cannot use the information without falling into fallacious
reasoning, the likelihood that the jury will misunderstand the evidence is very
high. Since the p-value actually provides little useful relevant information,
the high risk of misleading the jury greatly exceeds its scant probative value,
so it simply should not be presented to the jury.13 1
One imagines that plaintiffs' lawyers will complain mightily about
exclusion ofp-values because they have proven so helpful to them. However,
the attractiveness of p-values in litigation derives specifically from the
transposition fallacy. The fact-finder is trying to decide whether the
employer's workforce distribution was caused by chance or something else
and to make the decision using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard,
which is generally defined as more likely than not (50+% chance). To learn
that the probability of "something" is less than five percent bears
meaningfully on the question before the fact-finder only if it takes that
"something" to be the likelihood of random selection or the likelihood that
the employer did not discriminate.
As a case in point, consider the plaintiff's expert's testimony in Tabor
v. Hilti, Inc.136 The employer's statistical disparity was 2.777 standard
deviations from the "expected," and the expert testified (not engaging in the
transposition fallacy) that "the probability is less than 0.006 that a disparity at
least as large as this could occur solely as the result of chance factors, if
promotions were unrelated to sex."'3 7 What could thejury make of that 0.006
probability, if not the probability that chance was responsible? Jurors know
that the evidence presented to them has been screened for relevance, so their
minds are primed to attach significance to it."'
It is probably not overstating the case to say that there is simply
nothing a jury can do with the p-value other than misuse it or ignore it. The
best course is to force them to ignore it by excluding it from evidence.
III. BEYOND THE P-VALUE: OTHER PROBLEMS WITH NULL
HYPOTHESIS SIGNIFICANCE TESTING
Although the transposition fallacy may be the greatest problem with
NHST, it is not the only one. In fact, while use of hypothesis testing, p-values,
and significance levels proceeds apace in the legal world, there has been
' See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) ("Expert evidence can be both
powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in
weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more
control over experts than over lay witnesses.") (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991).
136 See 703 F.3d 1206, 1223 (10th Cir. 2013).
1' Id at 1223. Although the expert's testimony did not incorporate the transposition fallacy, the court's
description of the meaning of statistical significance did. Id. ("Statistical significance measures the
likelihood that the disparity between groups is random, i.e., solely the result of chance.").
31 Pun intended.
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substantial reconsideration of their use in the sciences and social sciences,
from which the law initially derived their use. 13 9
Responding to increasing concerns over NHST, the journal Basic and
AppliedSocial Psychology recently announced that it would no longer publish
papers using NHST, along with its vestiges, including p-values and the
labeling of differences as "statistically significant."' 40 Invoking the
transposition fallacy, although not calling it that, the editors of Basic and
Applied Social Psychology reasoned that the primary problem with NHST is
the problem "traversing the distance from the probability of the finding, given
the null hypothesis, to the probability of the null hypothesis, given the
finding."l4 1 Responding to the concern that, with the ban on NHST, it might
be easier to publish in the journal, they argued to the contrary: "[W]e believe
that the p<.05 bar is too easy to pass and sometimes serves as an excuse for
lower quality research."l4 2 Thus, the editors suggest supplying descriptive
statistics but not inferential ones. 14 3
Among the problems identified with NHST, in addition to the
transposition fallacy (which everyone who has thought seriously about it
understands is a problem), include the fact that the null hypothesis is often
quite unlikely to begin with, that NHST tends to encourage conflation of
statistical and practical significance, that deriving any meaning from the p-
value at all requires that the model be accurately specified, and that the
alternative hypothesis sought to be proved is often not the only alternative that
may follow from rejection of the null hypothesis.
1' See CUMMING, supra note 8; KLINE, supra note 14; Goodman, supra note 24; Nuzzo, supra note 21. But
see Richard L. Hagen, In Praise of the Null Hypothesis Statistical Test, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 15, 22 (1997)
(defending the continued use of NHST). Hagen acknowledges that "the NHST has been misinterpreted and
misused for decades," but argues, "[tihis is our fault, not the fault of the NHST." See id It's important to note that
even defenders of using p-values do not defend the transposition fallacy. See Clarice R Weinberg It's Time to
Rehabilitate the P-Value, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 288, 288 (2001) ("[The p-value] is not the probability that a null
hypothesis is true, nor is it the probability that we are making a certain error.").
" Chris Woolston, Psychology Journal Bans P Values, 519 NATURE 9, 9 (March 9, 2015).
http://www.nature.com/polopolyfs/1.17001!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdfl519009f.pdf.
Ironically, even this announcement in Nature fell afoul of the transposition fallacy. The following
"clarification" was appended to its original story:
Clarified: This story originally asserted that "The closer to zero the P value gets, the
greater the chance the null hypothesis is false." P values do not give the probability
that a null hypothesis is false, they give the probability of obtaining data at least as
extreme as those observed, if the null hypothesis was true. It is by convention that
smaller P values are interpreted as stronger evidence that the null hypothesis is false.
The text has been changed to reflect this.
141 David Trafimow & Michael Marks, 37 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2015).
142 Id. at 1-2.
14 See also Eric L. Eich, Business Not as Usual, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2014) (urging researchers to shift
away from their reliance on NHST); Instructionsfor Authors, EPIDEMIOLOGY, http://edmgr.ovid.com/epid/
accounts/ifauth.htm ("For estimates of causal effects, we strongly discourage the use of categorized P-
values and language referring to statistical significance .... ).
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A. The Null Hypothesis Is Unlikely a Priori.
One of the common objections to NHST is that it is "a trivial exercise"
because the null hypothesis is always false at some decimal place.'" The null
hypothesis assumes that there is no difference between two groups, and there is
virtually always some difference.' 45 David Bakan recounted an analysis of results
on a battery of tests given to a nationwide sample of 60,000 subjects:
Every test came out significant. Dividing the cards by such
arbitrary criteria as east versus west of the Mississippi River,
Maine versus the rest of the country, North versus South, etc.,
all produced significant differences in means. In some
instances, the differences in the sample means were quite
small, but nonetheless, the p values were all very low.
As he noted, "there is really no good reason to expect the null hypothesis
to be true in any population."'4 6 Thus, "when a null hypothesis offers an
implausible description of reality, rejecting it provides no information." 4 7
In the discrimination context, the null hypothesis is that members of
different groups-blacks vs. whites, males vs. females, older vs. younger,
etc.-have exactly the same probability of selection in the absence of
discrimination, so that a finding of different selection rates is prima facie
evidence of invidious discrimination.14 8 Given race' 49 and sex"'o differences
'" Roger E. Kirk, Practical Significance: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 56 EDUC. & PSYCHOL.
MEAS. 746, 747 (1996), http://joumals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0013164496056 005002; see also
John W. Tukey, The Philosophy of Multiple Comparisons, 6 STAT. SCi.100, 100 (1991).
'4n David Bakan, The Test ofSignificance in Psychological Research, 66 PSYCHOL. BULL. 423 (1966),
https://projecteuclid.org/download/pdf 1/euclid.ss/1177011945.
'" Id. at 426 (emphasis in original).
'4 Andreas Schwab et a]., Researchers Should Make Thoughtfld Assessments Instead of Null-Hypothesis
Siginficance Tests, 22 ORGANIZATION SCI. 1105, 1107 (2011), httpJ/psycnetapa-org/journals/bul/66/6/423.pdf.
14 See Adams v. Ameritech Serv., Inc., 231 F.3d 414,424 (7th Cir. 2000):
Studies in employment discrimination cases typically begin by defining the relevant
labor market, and then ask what the results would be for the salient variable (race in
Mister, age in our case) if there were no discrimination. That is called the "null
hypothesis." If the relevant market is 40% African-American, for instance, one
would expect 40% of hires to be African-American under the null hypothesis.
149 See, e.g., Richard E. Nisbett et al., Intelligence: New Findings and Theoretical Developments, 130
Am. PSYCHOL. 130, 130 (2012) (emphasizing social factors as explanations for well-known racial
differences in cognitive performance); J. Philippe Rushton & Arthur R. Jensen, Thirty Years of Research
on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability, 11 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & LAw 235, 235 (2005) (emphasizing
genetic factors as explanations for well-known racial differences in cognitive performance). Although
some scholars have suggested that racial differences in test results reflect test bias, see, e.g., Helen A.
Moore, Whiteness: Some Critical Perspectives: Testing Whiteness: No Child or No School Left Behind?,
18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 173 (2005); Susan Sturm & Lani Guiner, The Future ofAffirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1996), empirical evidence is unkind to that
contention, see Paul R. Sackett, Matthew J. Bomeman, and Brian S. Connelly, High-Stakes Testing in
Higher Education and Employment: Appraising the Evidence for Validity and Fairness, 63 AM. PSYCHOL.
215 (2008). Although the debate over the extent to whether genetic or environmental factors are responsible
for race and sex differences in cognitive performance has a number of public-policy implications, for
purposes of examining the use of NHST, the important point is that measured race and sex differences in
test results cannot help but have implications for occupational outcomes.
' See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Biological Sex Diferences in the Workplace: Reports of the End of
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in education, experience, abilities, and interests, we can usually be quite
confident that the null hypothesis is not ever exactly true-and often it is not
even approximately true. With large enough numbers, whatever difference
there is will be statistically significant. In the analysis that Bakan described,
differences appeared that would not have been predicted a priori; in the
discrimination context, however, the assumption that various demographic
groups would be identical in all ways that are relevant to workplace outcomes
is facially implausible. Yet, that is the assumption that leads to a conclusion
(or at least a presumption) that the employer has discriminated once chance
has been "eliminated" as an explanation by misinterpretation of the p-value.
But surely it is not true that, once chance has been eliminated, discrimination
is the most likely explanation for, say, the sex-ratio in nursing and auto
mechanics, or the dearth of black professors of nuclear physics at major
research institutions, or, for that matter, the rarity of white males in gender
studies.
B. Conflation ofStatistical and Practical (or Legal) Significance
An additional problem with NHST is that the significance level is
unmoored from any notions of practical significance. A finding is
conventionally labeled "significant" if the p-value is less than .05, "highly
significant" if the p-value is less than .01, and sometimes "very highly
significant" if the p-value is less than .001. But how impressed should we be
that results are "significant" or some variation of it? Does statistical
significance imply practical significance? Many courts assume that statistical
significance implies "legal significance," but should they?
Courts making the leap from statistical significance to practical
significance often employ what Geoff Cumming refers to as "the fallacy of
the 'slippery slope of significance.' "An effect is found to be statistically
significant, is described, ambiguously, as 'significant,' and then later is
Men Are Greatly Exaggerated (As are claims of Women's Continued Inequality), 93 B.U.L.R. 769 (2013)
[hereinafter Browne, End of Men] (discussing sex differences in interest and aptitudes that affect
employment outcomes); Kingsley R. Browne, Evolutionary Psychology and Sex Differences in Workplace
Patterns, in GAD SAAD, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY IN THE BUSINESS SCIENCES, 71 (2011) [hereinafter
Browne, Workplace Patterns] (same); Kingsley R. Browne, Evolved Sex Differences and Occupational
Segregation, 27 J. ORG. BEHAv. 143 (2006) (same); Kingsley R. Browne, Women in Science: Biological
Factors Should Not Be Ignored, CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J., 1 (3):509-28 (2005) (same); Kingsley R.
Browne, Biology at Work: Rethinking Sexual Equality (2002) (same); Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and
Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the "Glass Ceiling" and the "Gender Gap" in
Compensation, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 971 (1995) (same). The existence and effect of differences attributable to
sex in the workplace are controversial issues that frequently generate emotional reactions. See, e.g., James
Damore, Why I Was Fired by Google, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2017, at C2 (employment at Google
terminated after the author's circulation within the workplace of a document suggesting that some male-
female disparity in technical fields could be attributed to biological differences). Scientists acknowledge
that there is significant debate about the origins, meaning, magnitude, and effect of sex differences - but
not about the existence of sex differences. See, e.g., Larry Cahill, An Issue Whose Time Has Come, 95 J.
NEUROSCIENCE RESEARCH 12 (2017); Daphna Joel and Margaret M. McCarthy, Incoporating Sex as a
Biological Variable in Neuropsychiatric Research: Where Are We Now and Where Should We Be?,
42 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 379 (2017).
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discussed as if it had thereby been shown to be 'important' or 'large.'""5  But
sometimes the proper response to a showing that a difference is statistically
significant is "so what"?
The leap from statistical significance to practical or legal significance
should not be automatic. One problem is that with large samples, even trivial
differences can be statistically significant. Assume an employer with 10,000
employees that hires from a pool that is 50 percent male and 50 percent
female. We would "expect" the employer to have 5,000 males and 5,000
females. But suppose the employer has 5,100 males and 4,900 females?
Should we take that disparity to establish a prima facie case of a pattern or
practice of discrimination? Although it seems unlikely that an employer with
such a workforce could be said to have a "standard operating procedure" of
discrimination against women, the disparity is statistically significant at the
.05 level and for that reason alone would be accepted by many courts as
establishing a prima facie case.1 52  Yet, if one believes that the proper sex
composition would be 5,000 of each sex, that would mean that the employer
made 10,000 hiring decisions out of which 100 were discriminatory. It is hard
to see how something that the employer does one or two percent of the time
can be said to be its standard operating procedure. The effect of large numbers
on statistical significance has led Rick Jacobs and colleagues to suggest that
liability for employment discrimination may turn more on the fact that the
defendant is large than that the defendant is actually discriminating.
Small p-values derived from large numbers are not inherently
meaningful. In Bew v. City of Chicago, a disparate-impact case, the District
Court held that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of disparate
impact where the pass rate on the test for minorities was 98.60 percent
compared to the pass rate for whites of 99.95 percent. Most courts would
probably have said that a disparate impact had not been demonstrated,
because the pass rate for minorities was almost 99 percent that of whites.1 54
Yet, the Bew court found a disparate impact because the disparity in fail rates
was greater than 5 standard deviations (corresponding to a p-value of less than
151 CUMMING, supra note 8, at 29.
152 Cf Apsley v. Boeing Co., 691 F.3d 1184, 1200-01 (1 0th Cir. 2012) (although rejecting the argument
that there is a "practical significance" requirement, holding that where employer had recommended and
hired 99% of the "expected" number of older employees, a jury could not find that discrimination was the
company's standard operating procedure).
"s Rick Jacobs, Kevin Murphy & Jay Silva, Unintended Consequences of EEO Enforcement Policies:
Being Big Is Worse than Being Bad, 28 J. Bus. PSYCHOL. 467,469 (2013).
1" Under the EEOC's "4/5ths Rule," a disparate-impact is generally not shown unless the pass rate for
minorities is less than 4/5ths (80%) that of the highest-scoring group, although smaller differences "may
nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms."
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2016). In Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2014), the First Circuit
rejected the argument that there is any "practical significance" requirement under the disparate-impact test,
thereby holding that a disparate impact could be shown by a relatively trivial difference-6 of 529 black
officers and cadets (1.1%) tested positive for drugs, while 3 of 1260 white officers and cadets (0.2%) in a
given year tested positive.
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1 in a million). It is hard to see how the test in question constituted a
substantial barrier to minority achievement of the kind that the Court
disapproved in Griggs and its progeny. Yet, statistical significance was
extremely high, because the fail rate of blacks was about 28 times that of
whites. Ironically, this imbalance in fail rates was probably a consequence of
the employer's attempt to shrink the racial difference in pass rates by making
the test easier (to such an extent that almost everyone passed the test, thereby
almost completely undermining the purpose of the test), because shrinking
the difference in pass rates will virtually always result in a greater imbalance
in fail rates.'56
C. Interpretation of the P-Value as a Probability Assumes that the Model is
Perfectly Specified
Even an interpretation of the p-value that does not embody the
transposition fallacy nonetheless is incomplete in its statement that the p-
value represents the probability of a result as extreme as obtained assuming
the null hypothesis is true. What the p-value actually represents is the
probability of obtaining the result assuming the null hypothesis is true if
everything in the model is perfectly specified (which it virtually never is).'?
Consider the example described above where the employer has 5,100
men and 4,900 women. We saw that the result is significantly different from
'. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" An example of how decreasing the disparity in pass rates necessarily increases the disparity in fail
rates can be seen in the following example. Assume a test where the average white score is 100, and the
average black score is 85, with each group having a standard deviation of 15. (These figures roughly
approximate the race difference in performance on IQ tests.) If a minimum score of 100 is required in order
to pass, then about half of white test-takers would earn a passing score (since the required score is the same
as the group mean). However, only about 16% of blacks would receive a passing score (since the required
score is one standard deviation above the black mean). Thus, blacks would have a pass rate only 32% that
of whites and a fail rate (84%) that is 1.6 times as great as the white fail rate of 50%. If the employer
decides this is too great an impact and lowers the passing score to 85, then 84% of whites would pass, and
50% of blacks would pass, such that the black pass rate would now go up to about 60/6 of that of whites,
but the black fail rate would now be over three times as great as the white fail rate. Suppose that the
employer then decides that this is still too great a disparity, so it sets the passing score at 70 (which at two
standard deviations below the white mean and one standard deviation below the black mean, indicates
"intellectual disability," see Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1999 (2014)). Now, about 98%
of whites would pass, and 84% of blacks would pass. The black pass rate is now 85 percent of the white
pass rate, which would be small enough not to trigger the EEOC's four-fifths rule. But, look what has
happened to the disparity in fail rates. The black fail rate is now eight times that of whites. Thus, by
increasing the black pass rate as a percentage of the white pass rate from 32% to 85%, the ratio of black to
white failures increased from 1.6:1 to 8:1. The only way to avoid a finding of a statistically significant
disparity under the Lew rationale would be to eliminate large disparities in both pass and fail rates, which
could be accomplished only by raising the pass rate of both races to 100% or lowering it to zero, either of
which courses would completely eliminate any predictive validity that the test might have.
"s See KLINE, supra note 14, at 36-38. See also Colquhoun, supra note 76, at 3 (noting that "[t]he
number will be right only if all the assumptions made by the test were true"); Jesper W. Schneider, Null
Hypothesis Significance Tests: A Mix-up of Two Different Theories, 102 SCIENTOMETRICS 411, 421 (2015)
("When interpreting p values one should not forget that p is a conditional probability, i.e., the probability
of the observed data plus more extreme data, conditional on Ho being true, that the sampling method is
random, that all distributional requirements are met, that scores are independent and reliable, and that there
is no source of error besides sampling error .....").
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the expected distribution of a 50:50 sex ratio at the 0.05 level. Suppose,
though, that men and women are not, in fact, exactly equally interested in the
jobs. Assume that men are slightly more interested than women, such that the
true "expected" ratio is 51:49 rather than 50:50. This is a small enough
difference that it would not be perceptible to the naked eye, unlike sex
differences in interest in, say, auto mechanics or child care. In other words,
based upon naturalistic observation, no one would expect there to be a sex
disparity in the jobs, and it is unlikely that sufficient data would exist to show
that the true expectation deviated just slightly from 50:50. Yet, our employer
with its statistically significant 51:49 split has exactly what would be expected
by an omniscient statistician but what appears to be a statistically significant
shortfall of female employees to everyone else. If the actual split in interest
were 52.5:47.5-still a disparity that is not likely to be obvious to the naked
eye-and the employer's workforce exactly reflected that difference with
5,250 men and 4,750 women, the disparity would be statistically significant
at a level of 0.000001 under an assumption of equal interest. That is, the
conclusion would be that there is less than one chance in a million that a
randomly selected employer would have such a disparity if the null hypothesis
is true.
When one sees that a tiny misspecification of one variable can change
what is actually proportional representation into a highly statistically
significant shortfall, one can imagine the effects of the crudely specified
variables in the typical multiple-regression analysis."'
D. The Alternative Hypothesis Is Chosen Casually
Another of the problems with NHST in employment discrimination
cases is that the alternative hypothesis is seldom properly specified. We have
mostly talked so far about the null hypothesis (Ho), but the null hypothesis is
something that one tests in hopes of rejecting it. In NHST, the "alternative
hypothesis" (H,) is what one is really trying to establish. So, the null
hypothesis may be that a given drug yields results no better than a placebo,
while the alternative hypothesis-which is really why you are doing the
testing-is that the drug yields better results. The null hypothesis and the
alternative hypothesis should be defined such that they are both mutually
exclusive and exhaustive.19 in those circumstances, rejection of the null
hypothesis implies the truth of the alternative hypothesis.
In employment discrimination cases, the null hypothesis is typically
that the distribution of an employer's workforce is a product of forces that are
"8 See, e.g., Lavin-McEleney v. Marist College, 239 F.3d 476,478 (2d Cir. 2001) (using only variables
of rank, years of service, division, tenure status, and degrees in a compensation-discrimination case
involving college faculty).
`9 David Trafimow, Hypothesis Testing and Theory Evaluation at the Boundaries: Surprising Insights
from Bayes's Theorem, 110 PSYCHOL. REv. 526, 526 (2003).
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purely random with respect to race, sex, or some other criterion of interest,
such that any differences that do exist are a product of sampling error. The
alternative hypothesis is that there are non-random forces operating on the
employer's workforce such that members of the relevant groups do not have
the same probability of being employed by the employer. This alternative
satisfies the requirements of mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness, but it
should really be the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. Acceptance of this
alternative hypothesis does not mean that the employer took race or sex into
account in making employment decisions or even that the distribution is
directly attributable to employer action at all. As Charles Lambdin has
observed:
[T]he rejection of any nil hypothesis (a null of no difference)
supports all research hypotheses predicting an effect, notjust
yours-and there may be an infinite number of explanations
for the effect in question. In fact, all significance here tells
you is that you are justified in proceeding to test your
research hypothesis, not that your research hypothesis is
supported. And yet this fantasy leads to many articles being
accepted for publication whenever p values are erroneously
taken to suggest the research hypothesis is likely correct
when the methodology and hypotheses involved are
themselves doubtful. 160
In many cases, the race or sex disparities will be due to race-neutral
and sex-neutral reliance on traits that tend to correlate with race or sex. If
whites or men tend to have more relevant experience than blacks and women,
for example, then, to the extent that prior experience influences the likelihood
of hiring, outcomes will not be random with respect to race or sex. In the
racial context, racial groups differ substantially in measured IQ.161 If an
employer's practices tend to result in selection of applicants with greater
cognitive ability-whether because of reliance on results of standardized tests
that are correlated with IQ (as most are) or because many elements of an
employee's work history are also correlated with IQl6 2 -then the probability
"o Charles Lambdin, Significance Tests as Sorcery: Science Is Empirical-Significance Tests Are Not,
22 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 67, 76 (2012).
161 See supra note 149.
162 Frank L. Schmidt & John Hunter, General Mental Ability in the World of Work: Occupational
Attainment and Job Performance, 86 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 162 (2004) (finding a strong relationship
between general mental ability and job performance (and stronger than between personality and job
performance)); Linda S. Gottfredson, Why g Matters: The Complexity of Everyday Life, 24 INTELLIGENCE
79 (1997) (reviewing evidence of the importance of intelligence to job performance, especially, but not
only, in complex jobs); Nathan R. Kuncel et al., Academic Performance, Career Potential, Creativity, and
Job Performance: Can One Construct Predict Them All?, 86 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 148 (2004)
(finding that tests of general mental ability predict not only academic success but also job performance);
John Hunter & Frank L. Schmidt, Intelligence and Job Performance: Economic and Social Implications,
2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & LAw, 447 (1996) (intelligence is the strongest determinant of job performance,
primarily as a consequence of faster and greater acquisition ofjob knowledge).
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of selection of members of different racial groups is likely to be different.'16
A distribution that differs from the null hypothesis may not even be
the result of any action on the part of the employer at all, but rather because
members of the relevant group found the job less attractive than others and
were less likely to apply. t" Ajob that is either physically or financially risky,
for example, is likely to be less appealing to women than it is to men, and a
job that has a large social dimension is likely to be more appealing to women
than it is to men.1 65
The belief that rejection of the null hypothesis confirms the
alternative hypothesis has been labeled "the meaningfulness fallacy," which
often reflects two cognitive errors.1 6 6 The first is the belief that a rejection of
the null hypothesis in a single study implies that the alternative hypothesis is
"proven." The second is the belief that if the statistical alternative hypothesis
is correct, then the substantive alternative hypothesis must also be correct. In
the discrimination context, the statistical alternative hypothesis is that chance
is not responsible for the disparities in an employer's workforce, while the
substantive alternative hypothesis is that the employer has discriminated. As
Rex Kline has noted, if the alternative hypothesis is a substantive one, "the
work just begins after rejecting Ho," because now the task is to evaluate all of
the competing substantive hypotheses that are consistent with the statistical
alternative hypothesis, and if alternative explanations cannot be ruled out,
"confidence in the original hypothesis must be tempered."'6 7 The significance
test simply does not help in selecting among competing research
hypotheses. 168
Rejection of the null hypothesis in discrimination cases does not
distinguish among the myriad scenarios (other competing hypotheses) that
might result in a nonrandom workforce. All it does (at most) is eliminate
sampling error. Stated that way, the only alternative hypothesis that can be
161 If the disparity is simply due to differences in performance on a standardized test, the proper
challenge is based on disparate impact, in which case a racial disparity can be defended by demonstrating
that the test is "job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." But if the
disparity is due to the employer's consideration of a host of more subjective factors that are correlated with
IQ-such as, plausibly, education, references from prior employers, apparent job knowledge, or
articulateness-then data are unlikely to exist to explain the nonrandom effects of an employer's race-blind
selection process.
'" For a description of sex differences in occupational interest, see supra note 150. If good applicant-
flow data exist, then those differences can be incorporated into the statistical study, but if no such data
exist, as they often do not, then the assumption is likely to be that there is no difference. See, e.g., Catlett
v. Missouri Hwy. and Transp. Comm., 828 F.2d 1260, 1266 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1021
(1988) (comparing the 10 percent of the state's road-maintenance hires that were women with the 48% of
women in the general labor force); cf U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women in the Labor Force: A
Databook, Table 11, at 43 (2015) (reporting that in 2014, 1.5% of all highway maintenance workers were
women).
1s See supra note 150.
' KLINE, supra note 14, at 100.
167 Id.
" Lambdin, supra note 160, at 76.
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accepted as a consequence of rejection of the null hypothesis is that some
action on the part of either employers or potential employees is resulting in a
workforce that is not an exact replication of the demographics of the relevant
labor force. Discrimination is just one of several possible alternative
hypotheses,169 and there is often no reason to think that it is the most plausible
one. Nonetheless, some courts have explicitly placed the burden on
employers to show which substantive alternative hypothesis is correct once
the statistical alternative hypothesis is concluded to be correct. That is, once
sampling error is ruled out, they place the burden on the employer to
demonstrate what nondiscriminatory factor is responsible for the disparity.17 0
Again, that is contrary to the general rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion in discrimination cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Statistical evidence is widely perceived as providing the critical link
between a lack of proportional representation in an employer's workforce and
an employer's invidious intent. It is true that the greater the disparity between
an employer's workforce and the statistically "expected" workforce, the more
likely it will usually be that a non-random cause is responsible, though that
cause may not be discrimination."i What this Article has attempted to
establish is that the probability cannot be quantified in the way that it routinely
has been in the past, and, in any event, there is no reason to assume that
discrimination is the most likely non-random cause of disparities.
Null hypothesis significance testing, relying as it does on p-values
and labeling of differences as "statistically significant," provides a way, and
a relatively convenient one, of assessing liability. However, its relationship
to the real world-and especially to what people who use it thinks it does (i.e.,
provide a probability that the employer's selection was non-random, or even
discriminatory)-is attenuated at best. One might easily succumb to the
temptation noted by Jacob Cohen to rename NHST "statistical hypothesis
inference testing" for its more apt acronym.17 2
Evidence of p-values and "statistical significance" should be
excluded from discrimination trials. Such evidence may arguably be
"relevant" under the extremely low hurdle established by Rule 401 of the
.69 See Tagatz v. Marquette, 861 F.2d at 1044 ("All that the data show is that there is in all likelihood
a real, not a spurious, difference between the means of the samples compared. The data do not show that
the difference is due to a particular attribute (namely, being Catholic)."); BALDUS & COLE, supra note 55,
at § 9.02 ("[I]n order to assess the likelihood that chance was the causal factor in a disparate treatment case,
it is necessary to assume that all applicants were similarly situated on all relevant qualifications. . . ."); see
generally Browne, Beyond Damned Lies, supra note 5, at 503-541.
"o See, e.g., Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that once the
null hypothesis of random selection was rejected, it was the employer's responsibility to offer alternative
explanations).
"' KAYE & FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 378.
172 Cohen, supra note 8, at 997.
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Federal Rules of Evidence-requiring only that the evidence have "any
tendency to make a [material] fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."' 73 However, because of the ease with which p-values
and statistical significance are misunderstood, and the apparent difficulty-if
not impossibility-of overcoming that misunderstanding, they should be
barred under Rule 403, which permits the court to exclude evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . .. confusing the
issues, [or] misleading the jury."174 Indeed, it seems that misleading of the
jury is not just a collateral consequence of the evidence but rather its primary
function.
Although it is reassuring to be armed with quantitative studies that
purport to establish to several decimal places the probability that the employer
was selecting randomly with respect to forbidden criteria, these studies simply
do not establish in most cases what they are claimed to establish. If an
employer is truly engaging in discrimination as its standard operating
procedure, there ought to be disparities that are obvious to the naked eye and
numerous flesh-and-blood examples of it.'7 1 Statistical evidence that is
merely consistent with discrimination, but not particularly probative of it,
should not serve as the basis for multi-million-dollar judgments. Instead of
imposing liability based on a misunderstanding of probabilities, assessment
of liability should rest on more complex, subjective human judgments
untainted by statistical legerdemain.
'7' FED. R. EvID. 401. Under Rule 402, "[iirrelevant evidence is not admissible." FED. R. EvID. 402.
1 FED. R. EVID. 403.
" For an extended discussion of ways that the treatment of statistical evidence should be modified,
see Browne, Beyond Damned Lies, supra note 5, at 541-56.
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